The US School Breakfast Program: Short- and Long-Term Academic Effects by Rohlfs, Chris
Oberlin 
Digital Commons at Oberlin 
Honors Papers Student Work 
2000 




Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.oberlin.edu/honors 
 Part of the Economics Commons 
Repository Citation 
Rohlfs, Chris, "The US School Breakfast Program: Short- and Long-Term Academic Effects" (2000). 
Honors Papers. 515. 
https://digitalcommons.oberlin.edu/honors/515 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Work at Digital Commons at Oberlin. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Honors Papers by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons at Oberlin. For 
more information, please contact megan.mitchell@oberlin.edu. 
The US School Breakfast Program: Short- and Long-Term Academic Effects 
Chris Rohlfs 
Oberlin College 
Undergraduate Honors Thesis 
Final Draft 
Revised: May 23, 2000 
ABSTRACT 
This paper evaluates short- and long-tenn academic effects of the US School Breakfast Program 
(SBP). The paper divides into four sections: an introduction (page 4), a literature review (page 
11), a statistical model (page 31), and an empirical model (page 38). In the first section, we cover 
general facts and details about the SBP. In the second section, we first review literature relevant 
to the SBP (supply, demand, and short-tenn effects studies). Next, we explore studies of the 
long-term effects of schooling and of school quality. Many of the techniques and infonnation 
from these studies relate to our discussion of long-tenn effects of the SBP. In the third section, 
we fonnalize our argument that the SBP exercises short- and long-tenn effects on students' 
perfonnance. Our discussion of the statistical model follows the fonnat of the flow chart on page 
86. In the fourth section, we empirically test the hypotheses that the SBP improves students' 
attendance and expected education levels. We use pooled statewide aggregate data to measure 
attendance rates, and we use cross-sectional longitudinal data to measure education levels. We 
find that the SBP does raise attendance and education levels. We are able to quantify the 
attendance effect and decompose it into two separate effects. We are not able to quantify the 
effect on educational attainment, but we do find a lower bound for the SBP's effect on high 
school graduation. Given this lower bound, we are able to calculate a lower bound for the income 
) 
effect of the SBP. We compare our calculated income effect with two possible alternatives. We 
find that a dollar spent on the SBP yields a substantially higher return than the 10-year Treasury 
Bill interest rate. We also find that, dollar for dollar, the SBP's income effect rivals Card and 
Krueger's estimated income effect for classroom size reduction. We do not find convincing 
evidence that this return can be achieved by indiscriminately increasing the number of SBP 
participants. These findings indicate that recent efforts to expand the SBP through universal free 
breakfasts could be better directed. Indiscriminate expansion of the SBP does earn a fairly high 
return. Nevertheless, our research suggests that selective expansion of the SBP could capitalize 
on significantly higher economic returns. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 1998, 17% of US students participated in the US School Breakfast Program (SBP). In the 
same year, 57% of US schools participated, and the federal government spent $1.3 billion on the 
program. Last year, Congress passed a pilot program to provide free breakfasts to all interested 
students living in certain school districts. Recently, lawmakers introduced a bill to Congress to 
provide free breakfasts to all students in US schools K-12. The program would cost $400 million 
a year. 1 
The SBP is gaining political momentum despite relatively little feedback about the nationwide 
impacts of the program. The SBP purports to improve students' nutrition, eating habits, 
attendance, and learning abilities. School-wide studies have demonstrated that the SBP improves 
children's health, behavior, attendance, and some forms of academic performance. No studies 
have demonstrated lasting effects of the program past a single semester. A recent study of US 
schools showed that the SBP increases the probability that low-income children eat healthful 
breakfasts.2 No nationwide studies have demonstrated academic effects of the program. 
Economists have demonstrated that school quality variables significantly affect student's years of 
education and their earnings. Our empirical model draws from these studies. 
This paper consists offour sections. First, we include an introduction to provide a general 
background of understanding about the SBP. Second, we review literature written on the SBP to 
establish what aspects of the SBP researchers have studied and what they have shown. Third, we 
construct a statistical model to formalize our argument that the SBP exercises long-term effects 
on students' academic and labor market performance. Fourth, we construct and test two 
empirical models. Our first empirical model tests the hypothesis that SBP participation improves 
student attendance. Our second empirical model tests the hypothesis that SBP in the elementary 
school years raises students' expected education levels. We find that the SBP does raise 
attendance and education levels. We are able to quantify the attendance effect and we decompose 
it into two separate effects. We are not able to quantify the effect on educational attainment, but 
we do find a lower bound for the SBP's effect on high school graduation. Given this lower 
bound, we calculate a lower bound for the income effect of the SBP. We compare our calculated 
income effect with two possible alternatives. We find that a dollar spent on the SBP yields a 
1 Associated Press, "Government Plans .. . " 
2 Devaney and Stuart. 1998. 
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substantially higher return than the lO-year Treasury Bill interest rate. We also find that, dollar 
for dollar, the SBP's income effect rivals Card and Krueger's estimated income effect for 
classroom size reduction. We do not find convincing evidence that this return can be achieved by 
indiscriminately increasing the number of SBP participants. These findings indicate that recent 
efforts to expand the SBP through universal free breakfasts could be better directed. 
Indiscriminate expansion of the SBP does earn a fairly high return. Nevertheless, our research 
suggests that selective expansion of the SBP could capitalize on significantly higher economic 
returns. 
Long-term student effects of the SBP rely on a cause-and-effect chain. Schools mayor may not 
offer the SBP to students. Given school SBP availability, students mayor may not participate. 
SBP participants eat different breakfasts than they would eat at home. The SBP raises 
participants' morning and daily nutrient intakes. Because SBP participants eat better, their brains 
and bodies function more efficiently, they do not get distracted by hunger. The SBP gives 
students an incentive to come to school; participants are less likely to arrive late or to skip school. 
To the extent that the SBP improves participants' health, participants are less likely to miss 
school due to illness. As the SBP improves participants' health, participants' cognitive functions 
and emotional health may improve. Participants' academic performance may improve. These 
academic improvements may lead SBP participants to attend school longer. Because they may 
learn better in school and they may attend school longer, SBP participants may earn higher 
incomes because of the program. To better understand the chain of student effects, consult Figure 
2 on page 86. 
SBP Background 
All US schools, K-12, public or private, may receive federal reimbursements for providing school 
breakfasts. In order to receive reimbursement, schools must offer breakfast to every interested 
student. USDA reimbursement rates depend on the income ofthe student who purchases the 
breakfast. This section briefly describes the SBP's history, program goals, levels of availability 




Federally sponsored school lunches began during the Great Depression. The government sought 
to feed children, to provide a market for US agricultural products, and to create cafeteria jobs. 
World War II revived legislative interest in school lunches for two reasons. First, WWII draft 
offices had turned away a number of malnourished young men. This phenomenon brought 
malnutrition to national attention. Second, women's employment opportunities improved during 
the war, and the opportunity cost of preparing home lunches rose? Congress passed the National 
School Lunch Act (NSLA), instating the National School Lunch Program (NSLP), in 1946. In 
the Act, Congress asserted two goals: 
"To safeguard the health and well-being of the nation' s children, and to expand the 
market for nutritious agricultural commodities.'" 
Throughout the 1950's, many lower income students and schools did not participate in the NSLP 
because they could not afford the lunches. In the early 1960's, as part of Johnson's War on 
Poverty, Congress passed special assistance legislation for schools to offer free and reduced-price 
lunches to low income students.s Congress changed this special assistance to permanent funding 
in 1972.6 
The Child Nutrition Act (CNA) of 1966 restated the goals of the NSLA and set out to better 
achieve those goals. In order to do so, the CNA expanded the NSLP and created a number of 
new pilot programs, including the SBP. Congress renewed the temporary program in 1968, 1971, 
and 1972, and they voted in 1975 to make the SBP permanent. 
In the early years of the program, policymakers noted that many farm children ate breakfast early 
and worked before school. These children were hungry again by the time they arrived at school? 
Unlike the NSLP, the SBP targets both "low income areas and areas where children have to travel 
a great distance to school.',g The 1975 amendment to the CNA added the goal that the SBP "be 
made available in all schools where it is needed to provide adequate nutrition for children in 
attendance.,,9 
3 103rd Congress Pages 63-64. 
4 103rd Congress. Page 3. 
5 103rd Congress. Page 64. 
6 103rd Congress. Page 3. 
7 Devaney and Stuart. 
s Bu~ardt and Devaney. Page 178(S) (Quotation not cited). 103rd Congress. Pages 84-85. 
9 103 Congress. Page 86. 
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The USDA has consistently provided in-kind food donations as a part of school nutrition funding. 
In 1972, the USDA estimated that food donations constituted 7% of its total school nutrition 
budget. Beginning in 1973, Congress took steps to guarantee this average level of additional 
support, requiring that the USDA offer extra cash during times of food shortage.lO 
In 1977, Congress established higher Federal reimbursement rates for schools located in severe 
need areas, such as inner cities. In 1978, Congress established eligibility guidelines whereby 
schools qualified for severe need status.lI 
In the early 1980's, the new Congress cut back on SBP and school nutrition spending in an 
attempt to balance the budget. Under the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) of 1981, 
Congress tightened eligibility for reduced price breakfasts from 195% of the poverty level to 
185% of the poverty level, where it stands today. In addition, the federal government lowered the 
rates at which it reimbursed schools for meals served. The Reagan administration attempted to 
cut some other costs in the school nutrition programs. St. Pierre & Puma (1992) show that 
reforms in the early 1980's to reduce fraud in the NSLP were misguided. Many of the NSLP's 
eligibility errors can be attributed to income fluctuations. 
We can observe from Graph 1 on page 81 that the number of schools in the SBP declined 
between 1981 and 1983. We can also observe that the number ofSBP schools grew slowly for 
the remainder of the 1980's. We can observe from Graph 2 on page 82 that SBP breakfasts 
served per student dropped sharply between 1981 and 1982. Breakfasts per student did not reach 
the 1981 level again until 1990. 
Within a few years of the budget cuts, Congress revived its efforts to expand the SBP. In the late 
1980's Congress voted for higher reimbursement rates and higher nutrition requirements for 
school meals. In 1989, Congress authorized the "School Breakfast Start-Up" program. This 
program provides grants to individual schools to begin to offer the SBP. The Start-Up program 
generated a quick rise in SBP participation. From 1988 to 1993, SBP coverage increased from 
38,800 to 55,400 schools.12 Over the same period, US schools K-12 increased only slightly from 
117,000 to 118,000.13 
10 103rd Congress. Pages 117-124. 
11 I03 rd Congress. Pages 86-87. 
12 103rd Congress. Page 88. USDA Data Set. 
13 Digest of Education Statistics. 
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The SBP served 70,000 (57%) out ofa total 123,000 US schools K-12 in 1998.14 In the same 
year, 96,000 (78%) schools served lunches. Other school-based child nutrition programs include 
Afterschool Snacks (1998), Special Milk (1955), Summer Food Service (1975), Child & Adult 
[Day] Care (1978), and Nutrition Education & Training Programs (1966).15 All public and 
private schools are eligible to participate in such'programs.16 
The SBP is not nearly as widespread as the NSLP is. In 1992, schools served a daily average of 
4.92 million breakfasts (0.6 million full price) and 24.6 million lunches (11.7 million full price). 
Only 22% of students attending NSLP schools are certified to receive free/reduced price meals. 
On the other hand, 42% of students attending SBP schools are certified to receive free/reduced 
price meals.I7 In 1995, the NSLP was available to 92% of all grade students and 56% ofthose 
students participated on a given day.18 In 1995, the SBP was available to 69% of all grade 
students, and 19% participated on a given day.19 
Availability and Eligibility 
The USDA uses the same reimbursement schedule for the 48 contiguous states and for Guam and 
other territories. The USDA assigns Hawaii and Alaska each their own reimbursement schedules 
with higher rates. Reimbursement schedules vary according to students' eligibility statuses and 
schools' severe need statuses. The USDA reimburses schools more for each free breakfast served 
than it does for each reduced-price breakfast served. The USDA reimburses schools more for 
each reduced-price breakfast served than it does for each full price breakfast served. Students are 
eligible for free breakfasts if their families live at 130% of the national poverty line or below. 
Students are eligible for reduced-price breakfasts if their families live at 185% of the poverty line 
or below. All other students pay the regular subsidized rate. Schools that fall within severe need 
areas receive higher reimbursements in each category. Table 1 on page 83 shows the 
reimbursement rates for the continental US for the fiscal year 2000 (FY2000). In addition to cash 
assistance, the USDA provides commodity assistance. For FY2000, commodity assistance 
14 FRAC. USDA FNS, FACTS. USDA Data Set. Digest of Education Statistics. Total schools figures 
represent public schools. NSLP and SBP school figures include private schools that participate. 
15 Numbers in parentheses indicate year of inception. USDA FNS Child Nutrition. 103rd Congress. Pages 
32,97, 106, 125-127, 
16 Burghardt and Devaney. Page 179(S). 
17 USDA FNS, FACTS. 
18 Gleason. Page 214(S). 
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averages $0.1475 per meal. As of 1989, the USDA also provides School Breakfast Start-Up 
funding to encourage schools to begin to offer the program?O In order to receive reimbursement, 
each school sends the number of breakfasts it served to its school district office. Next, the school 
district office sends its totals to the State Department of Education (DofEd). The State DofEd 
sends its totals to the USDA. The USDA writes checks to the states, the states write checks to the 
school districts, and the school districts write checks to the schools. In some cases, schools serve 
satellite meals from school district kitchens, so that the district receives the final payment. 
Full meal prices vary by school. The USDA sets a nationwide maximum price for reduced-price 
meals. For the past five years or more, the maximum reduced price has been 30 cents~l 
Individual schools or school districts set the full price to cover remaining program costs. Let us 
consider the example of Non-Severe need breakfasts in the continental US this year. If the total 
cost of providing a breakfast exceeds $1.09, then USDA reimbursements will not cover program 
costs. In this case, schools might charge a high full price to subsidize the provision of free or 
reduced-price breakfasts. 
In 1980, the US General Accounting Office (GAO) published a stUdy researching reasons for the 
SBP's slow expansion rate?2 The authors found that financial burden significantly inhibited 
expansion of the program. Many schools lost money by participating in the SBP. The study 
described average losses per breakfast in different areas of the country. In 1994, Glantz and 
others found that reimbursement rates for school lunches typically exceed program costs. 
Schools often use the extra money to subsidize non-reimbursable meals and the SBP, which 
typically operates at a loss. Glantz and others and the GAO both cite labor and non-food costs as 
major difficulties. Glantz and others examined unreported costs of the program, including 
unreported administrative costs. The authors found that in SY1992, the full costs for the SBP 
excee.ded the reimbursement rates in 93% of SBP school districts. In 82% of SBP school 
districts, the full costs for the SBP exceeded the severe need reimbursement rates. Moreover, 
89% of school breakfasts were served at a loss to the institution providing the meal. The authors 
estimated a mean total cost of $1.67 and a median total cost of $1.38 per meal. 
19 Gleason. Page 217(S). 
20 USDA FNS. "SY99-SYOO Reimbursement Rates." 
21 Telephone interview with Terry Dougherty, Virginia Department of Education, 12/99 
22 GAO, "Major Factors ... " 
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Provisions23 
The USDA requires that SBPs conform to a specific meal pattern of two entrees, one fruit, 
vegetable, or juice, and one serving of fluid milk. An SBP entree consists of a meat or bread item 
or a meat or bread alternative. Meals frequently consist of cereal, juice, and toast. Sometimes 
SBP meals include eggs, pancakes, french toast, or sausage. We describe the foods served 
through the SBP on page 18 and on Table 4 on page 85. The USDA will only provide 
reimbursement for a meal if the student takes at least three of the four items served. 
Typically, responsibility falls upon individual schools to plan their own menus. Some school 
districts use one kitchen for multiple schools. We call meals from these kitchens satellite meals. 
Schools may use a variety of menu-planning methods to meet USDA guidelines and the USDA 
publishes a wide range of menu-planning materials.24 
Burghardt and others (1995a) examined meals from a representative sample of US schools 
through the School Nutrition Dietary Assessment Study (SNDAS) in 1993:5 SBP meals 
generally meet and in some cases exceed the USDA's goal of 14 RDA for both vitamins and 
protein. The meals did not meet the USDA's goal of 14 of the RDA for calories. The USDA 
encourag~s food providers to vary portion sizes according to different students' caloric needs. 
The USDA does not require SBP meals to include a meat or meat alternative for SBP breakfasts; 
both entrees may be bread items or bread alternatives. Consequently, SBPs include a meat or 
meat alternate about half the time. 
Dietary Guidelines/or Americans (DGA) recommends that Americans eat 30% or less of their 
calories from fat and 10% or less of their calories from saturated fat. A 1995 study found that 
44% ~fSBP meals meet the total fat goal. Only 4% ofSBP meals meet DGA's saturated fat 
goal.26 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
23 Burghardt and others (1995a). 
24 USDA FNS, Start the Day . . . , Healthy School . .. 
25 See page 10 for a brief description of the SNDAS. 
26 Burghardt and others. 
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The literature review divides into two sections. The first section consists of a discussion of 
literature regarding breakfast and the SBP. In the second section, we discuss studies that measure 
the economic returns to schooling and to school quality. This second section of the review serves 
two purposes. First, the studies support our premise that provisions like the SBP or school 
quality can significantly affect students' long-term performance. Second, when we discuss our 
empirical results later in the paper, we will compare our own results with results from these 
studies. 
Review of Breakfast and SBP Literature 
This section of the literature review divides into three subsections. First, we review economists' 
and nutritionists' work describing supply and demand for school meals and for the SBP. Second, 
we explore economists' and nutritionists' studies regarding breakfast and the SBP and how they 
affect students' nutrient intake. Third, we examine educators' and medical researchers' studies 
describing students' physical, academic, and behavioral improvements that result from breakfast 
consumption and SBP participation. 
Supply and Demand for School Meals and for the SBP 
Philip Gleason (1995) divides SBP demand into two categories. First, he asks whether or not 
students eat breakfast at all. Second, he asks whether or not students eat SBP breakfasts. We will 
examine the literature regarding SBP supply and demand in four parts. First, we will examine 
studies about schools' decisions to participate in the program. Second, we will examine findings 
from the literature about breakfast consumption patterns. Third, we will examine school meal 
and NSLP demand models. More students participate in the NSLP than do in the SBP, and some 
authors have compared the two programs' demand functions. Fourth, we will directly address 
, 
demand models for the SBP. 
School SBP Participation 
In 1977, the USDA Food and Nutrition Service (FNS) sampled 625 schools to explore school 
SBP participation.27 The study found that economic need, grade level, enrollment size, and the 
presence of snack bars significantly affected school participation. For a school to qualify as 
12 
economically needy, 40% or more of the students qualify to receive free or reduced-price meals. 
Economically needy schools were more likely to participate, and schools at lower grade levels 
were more likely to participate. Larger schools were also more likely to participate. Table 2 on 
page 83 shows the variation in school enrollment by grade level and school SBP availability. We 
might expect that larger schools enjoy economies of scale, which would lower per capita costs of 
the SBP. SBP availability probably does not affect enrollment size. Schools with snack bars 
were more likely to participate in the SBP. The authors suggest that schools could serve the SBP 
through the snack bar. 
Transportation, kitchen facilities, and required supervisory time did not significantly affect school 
participation. Students who did not participate in the SBP were more likely to ride to schools in 
cars. Students in the SBP were more likely to ride the bus. Nonetheless, the availability of bus 
service did not correlate with SBP availability. We might explain this relationship with the 
income disparity between the average SBP participant and the average non-SBP participant. 
Imagine that car rides to school are normal goods. Non-SBP participants, who are more affluent, 
will ride to school in the car more often than will SBP participants, who are less affluent. Schools 
that participated were more likely to have kitchen facilities and cafeterias, but the relationship 
was not significant. Supervisory time, defined as the length of time between teachers' arrival and 
the start of classes, did not affect school SBP participation. 
The Decision to Eat Breakfast 
Gleason splits SBP demand into two functions to compensate for contradictory income effects. 
Poorer students are more likely to skip breakfast, but poorer students face a lower price for SBP 
participation. Gleason (1995) and many other studies indicate that the SBP does not affect the 
probability that a student will eat breakfast. We conclude that the SBP exercises no effect on 
poor breakfast skippers. Hence, we can distinguish income's positive effect on breakfast 
consumption from income's negative effect on SBPeligibility. The two effects apply to different 
groups of people. 
Age, sex, income, and race play important roles in the decision to eat breakfast.28 In 1998, Siega-
Riz and others examined the demographics of breakfast skipping. The authors analyzed data · 
27 USDA FNS, 1978 
28 Gleason. Siega-Riz and others. 
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from the Nationwide Food Consumption Survey (NFCS) over 1965, 1977-8, and 1989-91. The 
number of people who ate breakfast declined dramatically over the period in question. Black 
children and adolescents and Hispanic adolescents skipped breakfast more often than did white 
students of the same age and sex. This difference held across all three survey periods. Beginning 
in 1977, lower-income students skipped breakfast more often than did higher income students of 
the same age, sex, and race. These gaps widened over the periods in question. From 1965 to 
1991, the percentage of adolescent girls who skipped breakfast jumped from 15.6% to 35.3%. 
The authors did not find significant correlations between the decision to skip breakfast and 
mother's employment, family size, or location. The authors also found no relationship between 
breakfast skipping and school SBP availability. 
Over the same period from 1965-1991, breakfast fat content decreased, and breakfast eaters 
consumed more whole grains, fruits, and cold cereals?9 The study indicated that breakfast 
skipping increased over the period in question. Fewer people eat breakfast than did before, but 
those who eat breakfast eat more healthful breakfasts than they did before. Hence, the increase in 
the percentage of healthful breakfasts might simply indicate a decline in breakfasts consumed. 
Morgan and others found that children who eat non-sweetened cold cereals are less likely to skip 
breakfast than other students are. 
Hanes and others (1984) examined data from the National Evaluation of School Nutrition 
Programs (NESNP). The NESNP consisted of a nationwide sample of 6,600 sets of students and 
parents and 1,900 schools. The surveys suffered very low response rates, and the study used 
participation on the day of the interview to proxy for SBP participation.30 The researchers 
determined that students in school districts offering the SBP were more likely to eat breakfast. 
They found that 85% of students in SBP school districts ate breakfast, compared with 81.5% of 
students in school districts not offering the SBP. 
Many economists and biostatisticians have examined the question, and no other researchers have 
found a significant relationship between SBP availability and breakfast skipping. Studies include 
Devaney and Stuart (1998),31 Siega-Riz and others (1998), Gleason (1995), 32 Nicklas and others 
(1993b), Long (1990), and Devaney and Fraker (1989). These authors have tested, through 
29 Siega-Riz and others. 
30 Wellisch and Jordan. Rush, " ... Editor's Technical Notes." 
31 Devaney & Stuart. Pages 14-17. 
32 Gleason. Page 218(S). 
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various methods, whether or not SBP availability affects the probability that a child will eat 
breakfast. The authors use three different definitions for breakfast. Some define breakfast as any 
food intake between 5:00 and 10:00 AM. Others define breakfast as any food or beverage33 
intake between waking up and 45 minutes after school begins. Still others define breakfast as any 
food intake between these times containing a minimum number of calories. Devaney and Stuart 
(1998) studied the effect ofSBP availability on breakfast consumption using each of these 
definitions. 
For example, Gleason used 1992 data from the School Nutrition Dietary Assessment Study 
(SNDAS) to analyze national NSLP and SBP demand. The SNDAS included interviews with 
food providers and 3350 students and their parents/guardians in 329 schools nationwide. 
Researchers considered different students' eating behavior over different one-week periods 
between February and May 1992?4 On a given day, 11 % of the students in the study skipped 
breakfast. When the researchers limited their sample to students attending SBP schools, they 
found that 12% ofthe students skipped breakfast.35 
School Meal and NSLP Demand 
Akin and others (1983a) took three days of data from the 1977-1978 NFCS and modeled the 
demand for school lunches. The authors found different demand functions depending on each 
child's age and free or reduced-price eligibility status. Note that the older students attend 
different schools than the younger students do. Middle schools and high schools might allow 
students to leave campus. The signs (+) and (-) in Table 3 on page 84 indicate positive or 
negative correlations. 
Black students were more likely to participate in the NSLP than white students were in all four 
groups. Urban students were more likely to participate than rural students were in all cases 
except for full price-payers aged 12-18. The authors speculate that urban areas provide these 
particular students with more alternative places to eat lunch. The free and reduced-price 
equations do not include price as a regressor. Note that income and price are confounded in the 
FreelReduced category. 
33 Not containing caffeine. 
34 Burghardt (1995), " ... Study Design." 
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In 1995, Qleason found that 74% of the eligible students in the SNDAS registered for free or 
reduced price meals. The main reason that eligible students did not register was that they did not 
realize that they were eligible. Free/reduced meal certification (requires application) figured 
prominently in the demand function for school lunch. Given certification status, income did not 
exert a significant effect on NSLP demand. For full-price payers, Gleason (1995) found a price 
elasticity of .25, very comparable to .19 in Akin and others' model (1983a). Hence, demand for 
school lunches is very inelastic. Other variables' that affect NSLP demand include access to other 
sources for lunch,36 sex (males more likely to participate), age (negative correlation), and race~7 
Students also bought fewer lunches when the calories from fat dropped below 32%. The average 
school lunch provides 38% of its calories in fat. 
McDonald notes the frequency with which eligible households combine benefits from multiple 
public assistance programs. Fraker and Moffitt found that many households received both AFDC 
and FSP payments. As we see from Akin and others' demand model for school lunches, FSP 
participation exerts some influence over school lunch decisions. Many school districts 
automatically grant free meal certification status to children ofTANF or FSP recipients. Hence, 
families of these students need not report their income when applying for free meals~8 This 
provision allows such students quicker and easier access to the programs. We expect that the 
demand functions for the SBP and other public assistance programs are mutually dependent. 
SBP Demand 
Gleason's 1995 study shows that, as with the NSLP, certification status, sex, and age figure 
prominently into SBP demand. Students certified to receive free breakfast were particularly 
likely to participate. Given that a student will eat breakfast, certification status, full price, age, 
sex, race, family income (negative), and urban/rural location determine SBP participation. 
Young, male, black, and rural students are more likely to participate than are other students. 
Students who are certified to receive free breakfast are considerably more likely to participate 
than are students who are not certified. Unlike with NSLP demand, though, students registered to 
receive reduced-price breakfasts are no more likely to participate than are full price-payers. 
35 Gleason. 
36 Though in-school carts and vending machines do not exercise a significant effect. 
37 The grouping of Asians, Native Americans, and Pacific Islanders was statistically more likely to 
purchase a school lunch than were other students. 
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Among full price-payers, price exerts a marginally significant (.05 < P < .10) effect on SBP 
participation, with an elasticity of 0.81. Hence, full price SBP demand is inelastic with respect to 
prices, but not nearly as much as NSLP demand is. Fat content and other taste considerations did 
not figure significantly into the SBP demand equation:9 
Using survey data from the Bogalusa Heart Study, Nicklas and others observed a broad cross-
section of children at two different periods in the mid-1980's. The group used parents' 
educational level as a proxy for income. The researchers noted that white children of more highly 
educated parents were more likely to eat breakfast at home than were white children of less 
educated parents. This relationship between home breakfast and parents' education level did not 
hold for black students. A majority (59%) of the black students ate breakfast at school, while a 
majority (56%) of the white students ate breakfast at home. Males were also more likely to 
participate in the SBP than females were.40 
Sharon Long found that, while the NSLP only supplemented food expenditures by about 50%, the 
SBP totally supplemented food expenditures. Using data from household food expenditure 
surveys, Long analyzed families' spending patterns and preference functions for school meals. 
Long's model showed that a dollar ofNSLP benefits reduced family food expenditure by about 
50 cents. Alternatively, a dollar ofSBP benefits did not reduce family food expenditure. Long's 
study indicates that all ofthe money spent on the SBP increases children's food intake. On the 
other hand, Long's study also indicates that half of the money spent on the NSLP does not 
increase children's food intake. This money simply increases the incomes of families in the 
NSLP. Recall that most NSLP participants do not qualify to free or reduced-price lunches. 
In 1985, Akin and others showed that the decisive factor for FSP participation was knowledge of 
the four food groupS.41 Similarly, food group knowledge and general nutrition education may 
factor heavily into SBP demand. Nayga (1997) shows that black, female, higher educated, urban, 
and southern household heads exhibit a higher demand for nutritious food. Similarly, heads of 
households who are not employed outside of the home exhibit greater nutrition preference than do 
other household heads. 
38 Oberlin City School District. MSDE official Carol Fettweis says that the waiver is relatively new in 
Maryland. 
39 Gleason. 
40 Nicklas and others. "Nutrient Contribution of Breakfast. . . " Nicklas and others. "Breakfast 
Consumption Affects . . . " 
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The Effects of Breakfast and the SBP Effects on Students' Nutrient Intake 
This subsection divides into two parts. First, we explore what foods students eat for breakfast. 
These include home breakfast foods and SBP menus. Second, we review literature describing the 
SBP's effects on students' 24-hour nutrient intakes. These studies rely on student and parent 
surveys. 
Breakfast Foods 
In 1998, Devaney and Stuart performed a USDA-funded evaluation of the SBP. The authors 
examined whether or not students ate complete breakfasts according to two different standards. 
The first standard for a complete breakfast included 10% RDA of five essential vitamins. The 
second standard for a complete breakfast included those vitamins plus representation from two of 
five major food groups. The authors found that, while SBP availability does not increase the 
probability that students eat breakfast, it does increase the probability that lower income students 
eat complete breakfasts by both definitions. 
Students do not necessarily eat all the food offered in school meals. Senator Tom Harkin notes, 
anecdotally, that students waste much less food in the SBP than in the NSLP~2 A school will 
only receive federal reimbursement for a school breakfast if the student takes at least 3 of the 4 
items served.43 In 1983, Akin and others (1983a) noted that elementary school students were 
required to take all five items with lunch.44 In more recent years, however, the USDA has 
allowed schools to provide Offer Versus Serve (OVS) options in high schools to reduce food 
waste. More recently, the USDA has required that schools provide OVS options. Through OVS, 
students may reject one out of four breakfast items or one out of five lunch items.45 
School breakfasts differ significantly from home breakfasts. Again using survey data from the 
Bogalusa Heart Study, Nicklas and others analyzed children's diets depending on where they ate 
breakfast. The authors observed a variety of differences in the breakfast food and nutrient 
41 Akin and others. "The Impact of ... " 
42 105th Congress. Page 3. 
43 Oberlin City School District. USDA FNS Pamphlet. 
44 Akin and others. "The School Lunch . .. Regression Analysis." Pages 478-479. 
45 USDA FNS Pamphlet. 
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compositions between lO-year-olds eating at home and lO-year-olds eating at school. The 
authors examined breakfast intake in detail and tracked basic 24-hour nutrient intake variables. 
In addition to those foods listed in Table 4 on page 85, home breakfasts were more likely to 
contain added sugar, salt, and fat.46 Students who drank milk at home were more likely to drink 
whole milk, whereas students who drank milk at school were more likely to drink lowfat 
chocolate milk. 
Compared with home breakfasts, breakfasts eaten at school contained a higher percentage of the 
day's calories, protein, carbohydrates, sodium, and sugars.47 School breakfasts also contained 
slightly more cholesterol.48 As mentioned earlier, Morgan and others compared the breakfast-
eating habits of 5-12-year-olds as a function of non-sweetened cold cereal consumption. The 
authors found that non-sweetened cold cereal eaters ate more healthfully at breakfast and over the 
entire day than did other breakfast eaters. In 1998, Nicklas and others suggested that the 
introduction of cold and hot cereals and lower sodium entrees would improve the nutrient content 
of school breakfasts.49 
SBP Effects on 24-Hour Nutrient Intake 
In 1989, Devaney and Fraker performed the first analysis of the Dietary Impacts of the SBP. 
Their study showed that participation in the SBP positively affected calcium and magnesium 
intakes and negatively affected cholesterol and iron intakes. SBP did not significantly affect 
vitamin A or B6 intake either way. The researchers expressed concern about SBP iron content, 
noting the prevalence of anemia in low-income children. The researchers examined 5-1 O-year-
olds' and 11-21-year-olds' 24-hour nutrient intakes through survey data. All else equal, young 
SBP participants showed significantly lower vitamin A and iron intakes than did young non-SBP 
participants. Older SBP participants consumed significantly less vitamin B6 than did older non-
SBP participants. SBP participants showed sigriificantly higher calcium intakes and significantly 
lower cholesterol intakes for both age groups. Other factors affecting nutrient intake included 
sex, female employment outside of the home (negative), education of female head (positive, 
particularly for older students), and geography. Males tended to consume more nutrients, as did 
younger students from the north:-central or western United States. 
46 In the form of butter, margarine, or mayonnaise. 
47 School breakfasts contained more lactose and fructose, whereas home breakfasts contained more sucrose. 
48 Nicklas and others. "Nutrient Contribution of the Breakfast Meal. .. " Gleason 
49 Nicklas and others. "Nutrient Contribution of the Breakfast Meal. .. " 
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In 1993 and again in 1998, Nicklas and others showed that a student's degree of breakfast 
consumption affects hislher total daily nutrient intake. Children who skip breakfast compensate 
by eating more at lunch and dinner. Nevertheless, these children net fewer calories and nutrients 
over the day than do children who eat breakfast. Students who eat school breakfasts consume 
more nutrients and calories over the whole day than do students who eat breakfasts at home. 
Both groups net higher amounts of nutrients and calories than do students who do not eat 
breakfast. 50 
Akin and others (1983c) use NFCS data to examine nutrient effects ofNSLP participation for 
children of different ages and income levels. The authors show that NSLP participation affects 
daily nutrient intake significantly more for younger children than for older children. The authors 
also show that NSLP participation affects nutrient intake significantly more for needy children 
than for non-needy children. The authors assume that the NSLP's affect on 24-hour nutrient 
intake is a simple function of an age dummy and an income dummy. Hence, all children below a 
certain age and income experience the same, higher nutrient effect. Similarly, all children above 
that cut-off age living above that cut-off income experience the same, somewhat smaller nutrient 
effect from the SBP. The authors estimate impact curves for a variety of nutrients for each of 
four different age and income groups. At the same time, the authors estimate the cut-off income, 
or switching point. At incomes above this point, the NSLP's nutrient effect drops from the higher 
constant effect to the lower constant effect. The authors construct impact curves for different 
nutrients. For each nutrient, they constructed four nutrient impact curves according to age and 
income groups. Their results show that free and reduced-price eligibility levels (130% and 185% 
poverty) fall well above the switching points for nutrient impact. The switching-point income 
occurred below 100% poverty in all cases, faIling below 60% poverty for three nutrients for older 
children. Hence, extremely poor children stand to benefit significantly more from the NSLP than 
do less poor children who still qualify for free meals. Moreover, full price-payers stand to benefit 
just as much from the NSLP as do free and reduced-price eligible students at higher incomes. 
The authors found a positive correlation between NSLP participation and 24-hour nutrient intake 
in virtually all categories. Moreover, needier children who ate non-NSLP lunches consumed 
50 Nicklas and others. "Nutrient Contribution of Breakfast .. . " 
Nicklas and others. "Nutrient Contribution of the Breakfast Meal. . . " 
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lower amounts of most nutrients over the day than did needier children who skipped lunch; I We 
might conclude that eating home lunches actually hurts students by crowding out more nutritious 
consumption at other points in the day. Alternatively, home lunch-eaters might come from 
different types of families than do lunch-skippers. Lunch-skippers' families might expect the 
children to eat school lunches every day. If so, then lunch-skippers' families might exhibit the 
same nutrition preferences as NSLP participants exhibit. These switching-points might not carry 
over to the SBP, where we observe less food waste. In the fIrst empirical model in this paper, we 
consider short-term effects for all children attending SBP schools. In the second empirical model 
in this paper, we consider long-term effects only for those children living below 100% poverty. 
The Effects of Breakfast and the SBP on Students' Performance 
We divide this subsection into types of effects. Medical researchers and some educators have 
studied ways in which breakfast and the SBP affect participants' physical, mental, and behavioral 
and academic performance. 
Physical and Mental Performance Effects 
Studies have demonstrated inconsistent correlations between breakfast and cognition. 52 The 
results of these studies differ considerably depending on the age and nutritional status53 of the 
child and the type of cognition tested. 
Tuttle and others (1954) tested the physical effects of eating cold cereal versus no breakfast on 
seven Iowa boys aged 12 to 14. The study turned up mixed results. Dickie and Bender (1982) 
did not fInd that eating breakfast on the day of a memory test affected London 12- and 15-year-
olds' performance. An Ohio study by Cromer and others (1990) did not fInd that eating an SBP 
breakfast affected 12- to 14-year-olds' cognitive test performance. These tests evaluated 
memory, attention, and visual and auditory learning. Cromer and others suggest that breakfast 
may not affect older children's cognition as much as it affects 9-11-year-olds' cognition. Older 
children's metabolism and intellectual demands differ considerably from those of younger 
children. 
51 Akin and others. "The School Lunch . . . Regression Analysis." 
52 Pollitt (1995). Page. 1134. 
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Simeon and McGregor (1989) found that the Jamaican school breakfast improved normaI9-1O~ 
year-olds' performance in math, language, and number memory tests. The breakfast negatively 
affected normal students' visual memory and wasted and stuntecf4 students' language and 
number memory. Powell and others (1983) found that the Jamaican SBP improved malnourished 
adolescents' math performance and did not affect spelling or weight.55 Lopez and others (1993) 
found that breakfast improved normal Chilean 8~- to ll-year-olds' short-term memory and 
problem solving ability. They did not find that breakfast improved normal children's attention. 
The authors also did not find that breakfast improved stunted or wasted children's inferior 
performance.56 
Pollitt and others' (1996) results disagree with the study described above. Pollitt and others also 
found that breakfast skipping affected 9- to ll-year-old Peruvian boys differently, depending on 
nutritional status. In 1996, Pollitt and others performed a study of fourth and fifth grade (9 to 11 
year-old) boys in the Peruvian Andes. The authors classified some children nutritionally at-risk 
and others not at-risk. The at-risk children did not perform as well in stimulus discrimination and 
memory search tests if they had skipped breakfast that morning. The same difference did not 
apply to students who were not at-risk. Students who were not at-risk discriminated visual 
stimuli more rapidly when they had missed breakfast. At-risk students did not display the same 
effect. Breakfast did not affect students' performance on number discrimination, picture 
vocabulary, shape and pattern recognition, or reaction time tests. 
The studies above describe the SBP's cognitive effects over a single day. Pollitt and others went 
on to test the effect of one month of participation in the Peruvian SBP. Stunted children 
performed better on the vocabulary test ifthey had been eating school breakfast that month, but 
the effect was not significant. Other tests also showed no significant difference;7 Attendance 
rates increased significantly during periods when the students were receiving school breakfast;8 
Pollitt (1998) has considered his results along with a number of studies conducted in Jamaica and 
in the US. Pollitt has concluded from these studies that a morning fast adversely affects short-
term memory and problem-solving abilities among 9- to 11- year-olds. Pollitt's studies have also 
53 Normal, wasted, and stunted. 
54 Wasting (low weightlheight) indicates recent malnourishment, while stunting (low height/weight) 
indicates past malnourishment. 
55 Powell and others. Pages 381-386. 
56 Pollitt and others (1996). Page (S)22-(S)23 . 
57 Number discrimination, picture vocabulary, shape and pattern recognition, and reaction time. 
58 Pollitt and others (1996). Page (S)23-(S)25. 
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shown that long-term nutrient deficiencies impair cognitive abilities. He draws particular 
attention to the positive effect that SBPs exercise on school attendance:9 
Behavioral and Academic Performance Effects 
Remarkably few studies have addressed behavioral and academic performance effects of the 
existing US SBP. Tuttle and others anecdotally noted that breakfast improved students' attitudes 
and scholastic attainments. Work by Murphy and others confirms some of this anecdotal 
evidence. Meyers and others observed performance effects of the introduction of an SBP in a 
Massachusetts school district. More recent studies have evaluated the effects of universal 
breakfast programs. 
Recently, Murphy and others found that hunger plays a large part in low-income American 
children's behavior and academic performance. The authors conducted parent and child surveys 
and analyzed the responses. The authors found that hungry children were more prone to 
hyperactive behavior and impaired mental functions than other children were. Hungry children 
were also more likely than other children were to exhibit tardiness and absenteeism.60 
The Lawrence, Massachusetts school district began to offer the SBP halfway through the school 
year in January 1987. The households of 7.6% of the eligible students declined free or reduced-
price breakfasts. Using these 7.6% as a control, Meyers and others (1989) observed a change in 
3rd and 6th graders,61 performance related to SBP participation. Over the semester, participants' 
mathematics, language, and reading test scores and attendance improved as compared with non-
participants. Most significantly, tardiness dropped dramatically among SBP participants. The 
researchers speculate that tests improved due to some combination of morning intake and overall 
health gains. These improvements might not entirely reflect results of the SBP. The variables 
that influenced student participation may have influenced student performance. 
Over the 1997-1998 school year, Murphy and others worked to apply their breakfast research 
results to the SBP. Murphy and others offered free breakfast to all students in two Baltimore 
schools and in one Philadelphia school. The authors surveyed students, parents, and cafeteria 
staff. From the onset, Murphy and others found that SBP participants were less likely to report 
59 Pollitt and others. "Does Breakfast ... " 
60 Murphy and others (1998). 
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depression or anxiety than were other students. Moreover, SBP participants earned higher math 
grades on average than other students did.62 
Once they implemented the program, Murphy and others observed a number of positive effects. 
Over the four-month study period, SBP participation rose from 15% to 27% of the total students. 
Universal free breakfast raised students' math grades, increased their atteI}tiveness, and lowered 
the incidence of in-school behavioral problems.63 Students' behavior at home and grades in other 
subjects did not change significantly. Kleinman64 explained that, while serious starving is 
uncommon in the US, the child hunger that does exist seriously affects children's academic 
performance. 
The Maryland State Department of Education (MSDE) expanded this study over the 1998-1999 
school year to include four other schools in four other Maryland counties. Murphy and others 
continue to collect data from participating schools. The recent pilot program offers free breakfast 
to all students, in the classroom. MSDE officials speculate that universal in-class breakfast 
eliminates the stigma cost of the need-based SBP .65 
Similarly, the state of Minnesota has provided funds to provide a universal free breakfast program 
in 41 schools. Recently, state and local authorities have been funding studies of the program.66 
Bro and others (1994) examined the effects of universal in-class breakfast on high-risk 14- to 18-
year olds in a Spokane, Washington vocational (welding) high school.67 The study recorded an 
increase in on-task behavior on days when breakfast was served. The study recorded no 
significant increase in attendance. 
Economic Returns to Schooling and to School Quality 
In this next section, we discuss some studies relating school to earnings. Many studies have 
attempted to explain children's attainments as functions of various inputs, including government 
61 8~ to 9 and 11 ~ to 12 years of age. 
62 McGreevey. 
63 Sacks. McGreevey. 
64 Another researcher in the study 
65 Peiffer and Kerry, MSDE Bulletin. 
66 Peiffer and Kerry. Begale. 
67 High-risk denotes single parent households, adoption, teen parenthood, or behavior problems. 
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spending on different programs. Haveman and Wolfe (1995) provide a extensive review of such 
studies, including a discussion of relevant theory, data, and empirical methods. In this paper, we 
empirically evaluate academic effects of the SBP. We would like to extend our results to draw 
con~lusions about the SBP's economic effects. To do so, we use results from human capital 
literature. Researchers have also empirically tested the economic benefits of improving school 
quality. Using these results, we compare the marginal cost-effectiveness ofthe SBP with the 
marginal cost-effectiveness of hiring new teachers. 
Returns to Years of Schooling 
Card and Krueger (1992a) use US Census data to estimate the returns to schooling for white 
males born in the 1920's, 1930's, and 1940's. The authors estimate average returns by state of 
birth. Returns to education ranged from 3.6%/yr. to 7.l%/yr. in the 1920's, and the returns 
ranged from 5.8%/yr. to 8.3%/yr. in the 1940's. The authors measure returns to education as 
percentage wage increase per year of schooling. 
Some studies in recent years have focused on economic returns to schooling holding family 
background and genetic endowments constant. Ashenfelter and Krueger (1992) and Ashenfelter 
and Rouse (1998) examine samples of twins with differing education levels. In both studies, the 
authors collected data from twins attending the Annual Twins Days Festival in Twinsburg, Ohio. 
These twins were more highly educated, more highly paid, younger, and more likely to be white 
or female than were average Americans. Moreover, the authors speculate that twins attending the 
festival exhibit more intra-pair similarity than do average twins. Among twins from the 1991 
festival, Ashenfelter and Krueger measured an average 16%/yr. wage increase per year of 
schooling. Ashenfelter and Rouse use a larger data set, collected from 1991-1993, involving two 
or three cabservations for a number of pairs. Ashenfelter and Rouse obtain a more conservative 
estimate of a 9%/yr. wage increase resulting from a year of schooling. The authors estimate 
different returns to schooling based on intra-pair averages for educational attainment. They find 
that the returns range from 11 %/yr. at 9 years of education to 8%/yr. at 18 years of education. 
Ashenfelter and Zimmerman compared father/son pairs and pairs of brothers from the National 
Longitudinal Survey (NLS). The authors estimated an average return to schooling between 
4.6%/yr. and 8.4%/yr. The researchers' estimates changed depending on the expected 
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measurement error. Fathers and younger brothers experienced significantly higher returns to 
schooling relative to sons and older brothers, respectively. 
School Quality and Earnings 
A number of economists have examined whether or not school quality affects children's 
educational attainment (in years) or future earnings. These economists' findings and techniques 
will help us to understand long-term effects of the SBP. In this section, we review recent 
literature that considers the association between school quality and education and earnings. We 
also briefly discuss similar studies of the long-term effects of other policies affecting children and 
adolescents. 
School Quality and Earnings, Holding Education Level Constant 
School quality affects both students' educational attainment and their earnings. First, higher-
quality schools motivate some students to attend school longer. By attending school longer, 
students acquire more relevant skills, information, and credentials. Consequently, these students 
end up earning more, later in life. As Card and Krueger argue, the correlation between school 
quality and earnings may become negative when we hold years of education constant. 
The most talented, ambitious students respond to high-quality schools by attending school longer. 
The least motivated students will drop out of school, no matter what. Some talented, ambitious 
students do not have access to high-quality education. These students may feel stifled in school, 
and they may find better ways to spend their time. 
Let us compare 10lh grade dropouts from a high quality school with 10th grade dropouts from a 
low-quality school. The set of dropouts from high-quality schools will not contain the most 
talented and ambitious students. The set of dropouts from low-quality schools may contain some 
of the most talented and ambitious students. Consequently, dropouts from high-quality schools 
earn less, on average, than do dropouts from low-quality schools. Holding years of education 
constant at lower levels of educational attainment, we observe a negative relationship between 
school quality and earnings. 
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We do not expect to see this negative relationship at the highest levels of educational attainment. 
Only the most talented and ambitious students rise to the levels of doctor or lawyer. At the 
highest levels of educational attainment, holding years of education constant, school quality does 
not exercise a negative ,effect on earnings. 
Students at higher-quality schools acquire more relevant skills and information each year than do 
students at lower-quality schools. A year of high-quality education better prepares a student for 
the workplace than does a year of low-quality education. Hold attainment constant at the highest 
levels,where the negative effect does not hold, and school quality exercises a positive effect on 
earnings. Among doctors and lawyers, graduates from high-quality elementary and secondary 
schools earn more than do graduates from low-quality elementary and secondary schools. Figure 
1 on page 85, copied from Card and Krueger (1998), illustrates this positive effect on earnings. 
Note the negative relationship between earnings and quality at low levels of education. The high 
and low quality education-earnings curves intersect each other at a point above the origin. Card 
and Krueger locate this intersection around high school graduation.68 
A selection process occurs around high school graduation, so that the most talented and ambitious 
students begin to attend the best colleges. Hence, the college admission process creates a positive 
correlation between school quality and student ability independent of the effects of the education 
process. Consequently, the actual functions for the curves shown in Figure 1 may not be as 
continuous as Figure 1 suggests. 
Long-Term Effects of School Quality 
Recent studies of school quality returns have focused on teacher-pupil ratios and relative teacher 
salaries. Hanushek (1986, 1989) and Hanushek and Taylor (1989) have evaluated the 
effectiveness of a number of different school quality measures. First, we review these discussions 
of school quality measures. Next, we examine empirical studies of the effects of school quality, 
In 1992, David Card and Alan Krueger published two studies observing the effects of school 
quality on students' future earnings. In one study, the authors examine the role of school quality 
in closing theblacklwhite wage gap for southern-born men born between 1900 and 1949. The 
authors pursued this concept further in 1996 by studying racially segregated schools in North and 
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South Carolina from 1900-1960. Note that these studies estimate positive earnings effects of 
school quality, because they do not hold education level constant. 
Eric Hanushek finds a number of problems with traditional measures of school quality. In 
particular, he argues that expenditure per pupil does not provide an accurate measure. Ifwe use 
expediture per pupil as a proxy for school quality, then we assume that all schools spend money 
with equal efficiency. Schools do not all spend money with equal efficiency, and schools 
generally allocate money inefficiently. Moreover, if we use expenditure per pupil as a proxy for 
school quality, our estimates capture variation in students' family backgrounds. Students at more 
affluent schools tend to come from more affluent families. Hanushek argues that much of the 
variation in school quality derives from variation in unmeasurable teacher quality. Many of the 
school quality variables that Hanushek (1986, 1989) and Hanushek and Taylor (1989) discuss 
exhibit reverse causation. When the average test scores decline in a school, the school district 
may increase funding to remedy the problem. This reverse causation causes an even greater 
measurement problem when we do not know the expected lag structure of the independent 
variables. Hanushek and Taylor note that a number of school quality studies use SAT scores as 
their dependent variable. Students decide to take the SAT based on their expected performance. 
Consequently, variation in SAT scores would not measure differences among marginal test-
takers. Moreover, SAT-takers and non-SAT-takers may exhibit different returns to school 
quality. These test-taking differences could bias estimates that use SAT scores as a dependent 
variable. 
Card and Krueger use pupil-teacher ratios to proxy for school quality because they measure 
specific services provided to the students. In order to examine the effect of school quality, Card 
and Krueger assume each respondent attended school in his state ofbirth.69 They use state 
averages"for school quality measures from the Biennial Survey of Education (1920-1958) and the 
Digest of Education Statistics (1960-present). Rather than examine school quality's effect on 
test-scores, Card and Krueger examine long-term performance measures. They use earnings data 
from the 1980 Census Public-Use A Samples. These samples link together individuals' responses 
for a number of survey questions. Variables include income, educational attainment (in years), 
state of birth, and state of residence. The samples include 5% of the US population. 
68 Card and Krueger (1996). Page 38. 
69 During the schooling periods in question, about 90% of students attended school in the states of their 
birth. When they account for this as a probability, rates of return to schooling increase by 5-15%, and the 
standard deviations rise by a corresponding amount. Card and Krueger (l992a). Pages 28-29. 
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Card and Krueger studied racially segregated schools in North and South Carolina from 1900-
1960. Schools for black students in North Carolina enjoyed better resources than did schools for 
black students in South Carolina. Schools for white students in South Carolina enjoyed better 
resources than did schools for white students in North Carolina. The school qualities for the 
Carolinas converged over the period in question. The authors find from the Carolina data that a 
10% reduction in class size led to a 0.4% to 1.1% increase in a child's future earnings. Figures 
that the authors examined in previous studies indicated that a 10% increase in school spending led 
to a 1-2% increase in students' future earnings. 
In another 1992 study (1992a), the two authors consider school quality as it affects the incomes of 
white males born between 1920 and 1949?o . Card and Krueger tested relative earnings as a 
function of education level, state of residence, urban versus rural residence, and state of birth. 
They found that the rate of return to years of schooling varied significantly by state of birth. 
The authors then linked each state to a variety of school quality measures, controlling for state-
and cohort-effects. These measures included average pupil-teacher ratio, average length of 
school term, and average teacher salary (relative to other professions) by state. They found 
significant effects for pupil-teacher ratio and for teacher salary?) Controlling for education, the 
authors found no significant correlation between parents' incomes or years of education and 
• 72 earnmgs. 
Julian Betts (1995) contrasted his study of the returns to school quality with Card and Krueger 
(1992a). Betts used data from the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY79) to 
examine high school quality's effect on white men's later earnings. With the NLSY79 data, Betts 
measured school quality more precisely by isolating the exact schools that respondents attended. 
Over three fourths of the schools in the sample contained more than one NLSY79 respondent. 
Betts found that respondents' incomes varied significantly according to the high school that each 
respondent had attended.73 Betts tested for the income effects oflibrary access, parents' 
education levels, and family income, none of which exercised significant effects. 
70 Card and Krueger (l992a). 
71 Card and Krueger (l992a). Page 19. 
72 Card and Krueger (l992a). Page 3. 
73 P < 0.000005 
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Next, Betts examined income effects of three school quality variables: teacher/pupil ratio, relative 
teacher salary, and percentage of teachers with graduate degrees. None of these variables 
exercised significant effects on students' earnings. Alternatively, when Betts used statewide 
averages for teacher/pupil ratio and for relative teacher salaries, he found that the teacher/pupil 
ratio affected income significantly. 
Betts suggests a number of possible reasons for this discrepancy. Statewide effects include 
effects for grades K-8, while NLSY79 school quality data only measure high school quality. 
Earlier school quality may affect earnings more significantly than high school quality does. Betts 
also addresses the young age at which respondents reported their incomes. Card and Krueger's 
subjects ranged in ages from 30 to 59. Julian Betts's subjects, on the other hand, ranged in ages 
from 17 to 32. Card and Krueger's older sample benefits from more highly educated respondents 
with more serious jobs. Older respondents are less likely to hold temporary jobs. 
Most significantly, Betts does not use pooled data. Because he only uses cross-sectional data, 
Betts is unable to control for school-specific effects. Schools vary considerably not only in 
resources, but in the types of students that attend. Betts's study finds that rates of return to 
education vary significantly according to the type of student who attends the school. The 
percentage of disabled students at a school negatively affects high school dropouts' earnings and 
positively affects high school graduates' earnings. Betts does not propose an explanation for this 
changing relationship. Betts also finds that white males from bigger high schools earn slightly 
higher incomes than do white males from smaller high schools. School and student population 
differences account for a large part of Betts's variation. These and many other school-specific 
variables add to Betts's error terms. Consequently, Betts' error terms may drown out school 
quality effects. When he uses state averages for school quality, Betts finds significant effe~ts. 
State school quality averages are likely to reflect educational policy, whereas school-specific 
measures may simply reflect school-specific demands. 
In 1986, Hanushek found no significant correlation between school quality variables and 
students' educational attainment. Hanushek used pupil-teacher ratios, teacher salaries, and school 
expenditures as quality measures. Hanushek measured educational attainment trends by year for 
the US and for the state ofIowa. Hanushek did not measure cross-sectional differences. 
Consequently, Hanushek's study may suffer from similar problems as Betts's study. A nUIIlber of 
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exogenous variables may influence year-to-year variation in educational attainment. These 
variables might include family income, immigration, racial composition, and family structure. 
Further School Quality Research and Long-Term Effects Studies 
In October 1999, Krueger and Whitmore published a study on Tennessee's Project STAR. 
Project STAR randomly assigned 12,000 elementary school students to particularly small classes 
for grades K-3. Krueger and Whitmore examined the program's effects on test scores and college 
test-taking. The authors account for self-selected test-taking by examining test-taking behavior in 
addition to considering test scores. The authors communicated with the Tennessee DotEd and 
with Educational Testing Services (ETS) to combine data. Krueger and Whitmore found that 
Project STAR significantly improved the probability that students, particularly black students and 
lower income students, would take the ACT or SAT. Project STAR also improved students' 
performance on the tests by about 0.10 standard deviations. STAR improved black students' 
ACT and SAT performance by 0.20 to 0.26 standard deviations. 
Economists have used Card and Krueger's methodologies to measure long-term effects of other 
policies related to youths and education. Angrist and Krueger (1991) examine compulsory 
attendance laws and their effects on long-term student performance. The authors plot educational 
attainment and earnings as functions of a student's season of birth, and they find significant 
effects. Students who are young for their grades stay in school longer and earn more later in life 
due to a minimum dropout age. Angrist and Evans (1999) examine the ways in which abortion 
reforms in the 1970's affect female educational attainment. White women did not show sufficient 
variation in behavior to measure the effects. Exposure to abortion reforms positively affected 
black women's educational attainments. Evans and Dee (1997) examine educational attainment 
as a function of minimum drinking age. Dee and Evans find that lower minimum drinking ages 
increase the probability that a teenager will drink. Using PUMS data, the authors find that 
drinking age does not exercise a significant effect on educational attainment. 
STATISTICAL MODEL 
In this section, we develop a statistical model to describe short- and long-term effects of the SBP. 
We construct this model to formalize our argument that the SBP exercises long-term effects on 
students ' academic and labor market performance. The equations in the model below correspond 
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to the ovals in the flow chart on page 86. We do not model school SBP availability, below, but 
recall that we discussed SBP availability in the literature review on page 12. We expect that all 
the equations in the statistical model exhibit serial correlation. We omit auto-correlation terms 
from Equations (1) through (9) for simplicity. 
Student SBP Participation 
As mentioned on page 16, certification status, family income, age, sex, race, and urban/rural 
location weigh heavily into SBP demand. Given that a student's school participates in the SBP, 
we might model SBP demand as follows: 
Our universe includes all students K-12 who attend SBP schools. SBP;,I represents the fraction of 
mornings in the school year t in which student i eats a school breakfast. YFam;,1 represents the 
student's family income that year. Given eligibility status, this effect may be positive or negative, 
depending on whether or not school breakfast is a normal good. The free SBP is not a normal 
good, because a higher income does not reduce the cost of participation. Price;,1 represents the 
price that the pupil faces for school breakfasts. Price;,1 varies from student to student depending 
on eligibility status and the school that the student attends. For instance, Price;,1 returns a zero if 
student i lives at 130% poverty or below. We expect the price effect to be negative. FElig;,/ 
returns a one if the student is eligible for free meals and a zero otherwise. RElig;,1 returns a one if 
the student is eligible for reduced-price meals and a zero otherwise. We expect that both 
eligibility dummies exert positive effects on SBP demand. We expect a4 to exceed as. Students 
eligible for free meals face a lower cost for SBP participation than do students eligible for 
reduced-price meals. X;,/ represents a vector of control variables. We expect that X;,I would 
include the student's age in year t and dummies for the student's sex and race. X;,I would also 
include a dummy to represent whether the student lived in an urban or rural location in year t. As 
Gleason (1995) notes, younger students are more likely to participate in the SBP than are older 
students. Black students are more likely to participate than are non-black students. Male students 
are more likely to participate than are female students, and rural students are more likely to 
participate than are urban students. 
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Gleason (1995) found that price and income affected student participation differently depending 
on each student's certification status. To estimate these different effects for income, we can 
multiply the eligibility dummies each by YFam;". Note that, for all students eligible for free 
meals, Price;" returns a zero. Hence, we would not estimate a free meal price effect. To estimate 
the different effects for the price, we would multiply the reduced-price eligibility dummy and the 
non-eligibility dummy each by Price;". Hence, we create five different regressors in place of 
YFam;" and by Price;". With these specifications, Equation (1) becomes Equation (1 a), below: 
(Ia.) SBP;" = al + a2*(FElig;")*YFam;,, + a3*(RElig;")*YFam;,, + ~*(NElig;")*YFam;,, 
+ a5*(RElig;")*Price;,, + ar,*(NElig;")*Price;,, + a7*FElig;" + ag*RElig;" + ~*Xla,;,1+ Ula,;,1 
NElig;" represents (1 - FElig;,1)*(1 - RElig;,,), and returns a one if the student is not eligible for free 
or reduced-price meals and a zero otherwise. We expect a2 to be negative. Among students 
eligible for free meals, as income rises, family income comes closer to the eligibility threshold. 
Hence, as a family'S income rises, the family is less likely to know its eligibility status. Hence, 
given free meal eligibility, families with higher incomes are less likely to register to receive free 
meals. Moreover, because free meals have a price zero, we expect that free meals are inferior 
goods. We do not predict signs for a3 or ~, because we do not know whether or not reduced-
price or full-price school breakfasts are normal goods. We expect negative signs for both price 
effects. 
Short-Term Effects 
For the purposes of this paper, short-term effects last less than one school year. Short-term 
effects include nutrient intake, health, attendance, and cognition improvements resulting from the 
SBP. For all the short-term effects we consider below, our universe includes all US students K-
12. For the short-term effects we consider in our empirical model, our universe includes all US 
students K-12 attending SBP schools. 
Nutrient Intake 
As described in the literature review, researchers have found that the SBP increases a student's 
expected intake for many nutrients. We are most interested in nutrient intake adjusted for each 
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student's nutrient needs. Hence, we divide nutrient intake by each student's body weight in 
pounds. 
Ntri,l,lI represents student i's intakes per pound body weight in year t for a vector of nutrients n. 
~,i,1 represents a vector of controls by which nutrient intake might vary. These controls might 
include the student's age, income, and geographic area in year t as well as the student's age and 
sex. We might also include variables to represent parents' education levels and the female 
household head's degree of employment outside of the home. As noted in the literature review, 
the SBP may exert a negative effect on a student's intake for some nutrients, such as iron. For 
most nutrients n, however, we expect that the SBP exerts a positive effect on nutrient intake and 
that P2,11 is positive. 
Physical and Emotional Health 
Murphy (1998) has recently shown that universal free SBPs reduce the number of school nurse 
visits and reported emotional and behavioral problems. Hence, we expect that SBP participation 
positively influences a student's physical and emotional health. 
(4) EHealthi., = 01 + 02 * Ntri,l,lI + 03 * Healthi" + 04 * X4,i,l + U4,i,1 
Healthi,l and EHealthi" represent abstract measures of physical and emotional health, respectively. 
Measures might include number of school days divided by the number of nurse visits or the 
number of disruptions in class, respectively. We describe emotional health as happiness, attitude 
toward school, and motivation. We expect that nutrient intake positively affects both physical 
and emotional health, so that Y2 > 0 and 02 > O. We also expect that physical health positively 
affects a student's attitude so that 03> O. X3,i,l and X4,i,1 represent control vectors. We might wish 
to control for age, sex, race, urbanlrurallocation, family income, and parent's education levels. 




We would like to measure the SBP's effect on students' attendance. As shown in Figure 2, this 
effect works through a number of different channels. The SBP affects attendance directly by 
providing an incentive for children to attend school. The SBP also improves students' nutrient 
intake, which, in tum, improves students' physical and emotional health. Less healthy students 
are more likely than other students are to miss school because of illness. As a student becomes 
better adjusted or more motivated, we expect the student to feign illness less often or to skip 
school less often. 
Attendi,l represents the proportion of school days in school year t in which student i attends 
school. We expect &2, &3, and &4 all to be positive. XS,i,l represents a vector of controls which 
might include sex, age, race, school quality, family income, and parent's education level. 
Cognition 
A number of studies have shown that children can improve their performance on standardized 
tests by eating healthful breakfasts. We expect that nutrition positively affects test performance. 
We also expect that better adjusted or more motivated students perform better on tests. 
COgi,1 denotes cognitive ability. We might measure Cogi,l with a test score or with a vector of 
different test scores. In X 6,i,l, we might control for sex, race, age, urbanlrurallocation, family 
income, parents' education levels, and attendance. 
Hanushek (1986) notes that researchers have not found convincing evidence linking school 
quality and standardized test performance. Few researchers would doubt that cognitive abilities 
influence wages. See Heckman (1995) and Murnane and others (1995) for discussions ofthe 
importance of cognitive skills in wage determination.74 Card and Krueger (1992a) find that 
school quality significantly affects students' earnings, even if it does not significantly affect 
74 Murnane and others (1995). Card and Krueger (1998). 
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students' cognitive test performance. As proposed in Figure 2, cognition is not the only channel 
through which the SBP can affect students long-term performance or earnings. 
Long-Term Effects 
We define long-term effects to last one school year or longer. These effects include school 
performance and future earnings. The SBP does not directly affect either ofthese long-term 
variables .. Consequently, we do not include SBP as a regressor in either equation. Nevertheless, 
the independent variables in the equations below trace back to SBP participation through a cause-
and-effect chain. 
School Performance 
A number of factors affect a student's performance in school. Among the variables that we have 
already defined, we expect cognition, emotional health, and attendance to affect school 
performance. For whatever reasons, some students perform better than others do in controlled 
settings. We expect differences in school performance to reflect these differences. Cognitive 
tests also capture some of these differences. Emotional health may affect school performance in 
ways that cognition does not capture. For instance, students may test well but act disruptive in 
classroom settings. Students who attend school more often expose themselves to the material 
more. Hence, we expect attendance to improve school performance. 
(7) Pert,/ = 111 + 112*COgi,/ + 113*EHealth;" + 114*Attend;" + 115*X7,;,/ + U7,;,/ 
Pert,/ represents an abstract measure of student i's performance in school year t. We could 
measure this variable with class rank, grade-point average adjusted for class difficulty, or a vector 
of class grades, also adjusted for class difficulty. We expect 112,113, and 114 to be positive. We 
might include race, sex, family income, and parents' education levels in x,,;,/. 
Educational Attainment 
Once we understand students' performance in school, we can begin to model students' 
educational attainment (in years). Given school performance, variables like cognition and 
attendance become irrelevant. We are not interested in the methods that lead to the student's 
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success. We are only interested in the outcome. If a student performs better in school, then that 
student can expect to earn a higher grade and to learn more from the next year of schooling. A 
student who performs better in school in year t has a greater probability of passing the next grade 
in year t + 1. Hence, the student who performs better in school faces a smaller risk in attending 
another year of school. We also expect that students who are better adjusted or more motivated 
stay in school longer. 
Attain; represents the (former) student's highest grade completed. We measure this variable in 
years of education not including failed grades. We expect 82 and 83 to be positive. Xg,;,1 denotes a 
vector of control variables which might include sex, race, school quality, family income, and 
parents' education levels. 
Future Earnings 
In the equation below, we address earnings as an indirect function ofthe SBP. Earnings do not 
precisely measure the quality of a job or a subject's total welfare. A number of other variables 
figure into any given individual's utility function. Although earnings do not correspond precisely 
with utility, earnings data do provide us with important information about each (former) student's 
welfare. The SBP's earnings effect is particularly interesting because we are evaluating the 
effects of a program designed in part to reduce poverty. 
¥i,1 denotes (former) student i's future earnings for year t. Persons with higher education levels 
earn higher wages. Similarly, persons who performed better as students are likely to perform 
better at their jobs. We expect persons who perform better at work to earn higher wages. For 
control variables, we might include sex, race, school quality, and parents' incomes and education 
levels. 
We have constructed a long chain of relationships. By substitution, this chain traces earnings and 
educational attainment back to a multivariate function that includes SBP participation on the 
right-hand side. In the empirical model below, we ignore many of the intermediate steps, and we 
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regress attendance and educational attainment directly onto SBP participation. Having done so, 
we regress employment and wages onto educational attainment to help us to interpret our results. 
EMPIRICAL MODEL 
We test academic effects of the SBP with two empirical models. Inour first model, we examine 
the SBP's statewide aggregate attendance rates. In our second model, we use longitudinal data to 
estimate the SBP's effects on educational attainment and earnings. We begin by describing the 
available data. Second, we describe the variables and equations that we use, and how they apply 
to our hypotheses. Finally, we examine our results and draw conclusions. On pages 101-105, we 
include glossaries of variables for the empirical models. 
Data 
Our models make use of data from the USDA and from the NLSY79 Geocode file. The USDA 
has provided us with statewide aggregate data about the SBP. The USDA data set also includes 
some statewide aggregate statistics about schools that participate in the SBP, such as attendance 
and enrollment. The NLSY79 provides us with a variety of information about a 12,686 of 
individuals born between 1957 and 1965. This information includes variables describing these 
individuals' demographics, family backgrounds, education levels, and labor market experiences. 
In addition the data described below, we also use statewide attendance and enrollment figures 
from the NCES' s annual Digest of Education Statistics. These data measure enrollment annually 
by state from 1962-1997 and attendance annually by state from 1962-1995. When we explore 
labor market effects in the second section of Model 2, we use CPI and employment and 
population data obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). In Model2b, we also make 
use of labor market and interest rate data from the 1995 Economic Report of the President. 
USDA Data 
The USDA has provided us with SBP data both annually by state and nationwide by month for a 
number of variables. These data cover 32 years, beginning in 1967, when the pilot SBP began. 
The data cover 58 states and territories, but we will only consider the 50 states and Washington, 
DC. Table 5 on page 87 lists the variables available through the USDA SBP data set. 
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The different SBP variables provide information about different aspects of SBP availability and 
participation. If a school receives any federal reimbursement for the SBP, we call that school an 
SBP school. According to the provisions of the program, any child attending an SBP school may 
participate in the SBP. We use the Enrollment and Average Daily Attendance (ADA) in SBP 
schools variables in our first empirical model. These variables tell us how many children had the 
opportunity to participate in the SBP in a given state and year. 
SBP participants do not necessarily eat school breakfasts every morning. The Participants 
variable tells us how many students participated in the SBP at all. Only students enrolled in the 
school may participate in the program, so Participants will necessarily be smaller than 
Enrollment in SBP schools. As explained on page 9, many schools offer the NSLP but not the 
SBP. The next two variables tell us how many students were registered to receive free or 
reduced-price meals in the state that year. These students include lunch buyers at non-SBP 
schools. For the USDA to approve a student to receive free or reduced-price meals, the student 
must both apply and meet income eligibility requirements. If a student attends an SBP school, 
then that student faces a greater incentive to register for free or reduced-price meals. 
Unfortunately, the USDA does not differentiate between eligible students at SBP schools and 
eligible students at non-SBP schools. 
The USDA also provides information about the number of school breakfasts served in each state 
each year. The Total Breakfasts, Free Breakfasts, and Reduced-Price Breakfasts variables give 
the numbers of meals served over the entire year. Average Daily Breakfasts represents the 
average number of breakfasts served in the state that year during the peak month nationwide. 
Average Indemnity Rate denotes the percentage of schools with more than 40% of the students 
living at 130% poverty or below. These schools qualify for special need status, which, as 
explained on page 8, grants them higher reimbursement rates per breakfast. 
Federal Reimbursement includes Start-Up funding and reimbursements per meal, which depend 
on each student's eligibility status and each school's special need status. During the earliest years 
of the program, the USDA tracked more specific information about the SBP budget. 
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In order to better understand the SBP data, we examine Equations (10), (11), and (12) as 
illustrated in Tables 7, 8, and 9: 
BP As" represents total breakfasts served in state s and year t divided by state s' s ADA in year t. 
Our sample includes observations from 51 states (including DC) for the years from 1967 to 1995. 
Year/ represents a vector of dummies for each year from 1970 to 1995; we omit the years 1967-
1969 for comparison. States represents a vector of 50 dummy variables, one for each state 
(including DC); we omit New York for comparison. 
In Equation (10), we examine BPAs" as a simple function of a constant and two auto-correlation 
terms. In Equation (11), we regress BPAs" on the two auto-correlation terms and 26 year 
dummies. In Equation (12), we regress BP As" on the two auto-correlation terms and 50 state 
dummies. 
We see from Table 7 that the data are highly serially correlated, and that these two regressors 
together with a constant explain 98% of the variance in BPAs,l. When we omit K3*UIO,s,/-2, our 
Durbin-Watson statistic drops from 2.04 to 1.37. This change indicates that K3 *UIO,s,l-2 controls 
for a significant amount of serial correlation in the model. When we do omit K3 *UIO,s,,-2, K2 drops 
from 1.34 to 1.02. We can offer no explanation for K3'S negative value. For some reason, given 
serial correlation for one year, an overestimate in year t leads to an underestimate in year t +2. 
Nevertheless, this anomaly does not affect our models. The dependent variables in our empirical 
models do not exhibit serial correlation past a single year. 
In Equation (11), evaluated in Table 8, we include fixed year-effects to capture nationwide annual 
changes in the program. We omit the first three year-dummies, so we can consider our year-
dummy coefficients in comparison to the first three years of the program. Individually, none of 
the year dummies show significant effects. Nevertheless, adding the year-dummies together 
reduces the sum of squared residuals by 20%. Using a chi-square test, we can reject the null 
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hypothesis that the year-dummy coefficients equal zero with greater than 99% certainty. We can 
compare the change in BP As,t in Table 8 to the change in 100*BreakfastslEnrollment shown in 
Graph 2 on page 82. The auto-correlation terms catch much of the upward time trend in BPAs,t. 
Once we control for serial correlation, our steady rises become more erratic. Nonetheless, our 
coefficients coincide with some of our initial observations about Graph 2. We observe a sharp 
drop in BP Ai,t in 1982, which coincides with the drop in 100*BreakfastslEnrollment in 1982 in 
Graph 2. This drop coincides with cost-cutting efforts during the Reagan administration. We 
also observe that the coefficients for the years after 1981 all fall below zero. We observe a 
similar relationship in Graph 2. The slope in Graph 2 for 1 OO*BreakfastslEnrollment over the 
first 15 years of the program generally exceeds the slope for 100*BreakfastslEnrollment over the 
1980's. 
Equation (12), which we evaluate in Table 9, includes fixed state effects. Through this model, we 
understand general state-level differences in SBP participation. We have omitted New York so 
that the coefficient for state-dummy s denotes the average difference in BPAs,t between New York 
and state s. As with the year-dummies, many of the individual state-dummies do not show 
significant effects, but considered together, they pass a chi-square test with greater than 99% 
certainty. The states with the most significant and positive effects include Mississippi, Kentucky, 
Louisiana, and West Virginia. These four states have ranked in the poorest half of states for the 
past 25 years, usually ranking in the poorest quintile. 7s The states with the most significant and 
negative effects include Wisconsin, Utah, Alaska, and Wyoming. In 1990, Alaska and Wyoming 
ranked as the two least densely populated states, and Utah ranked 1 Olh?6 Over the past 25 years, 
Alaska has ranked among the 7 states with the highest median 4-person family income, often 
ranking number 1. Wisconsin typically ranks in the second quartile along the same distribution. 
We expect poorer states to participate more in the program. If more poor children live in a given 
state, then more children in that state qualify to receive free or reduced-price meals. Moreover, a 
state with more poor children might also contain more schools that qualify for special need status. 
Schools that qualify for special need status receive higher reimbursement rates. Hence, these 
schools face lower costs for SBP participation. For similar reasons, we might expect affluent 
states to participate less in the program. As mentioned on page 7, the SBP was designed in part 
to feed children from rural areas. As noted in the literature review on page 12, bigger schools are 
7S US Census, "Median Income for 4-Person Families, by State." 
76 US Census, "Land Area, Population, and Density for States and Counties: 1990." 
41 
more likely to join the SBP. For th~se reasons, we might expect that schools in non-agricultural 
states with lower population density would be less likely to join the program. 
NLSY79 Geocode 
Our longitudinal data come from the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY79), 
conducted by the National Opinion Research Center (NORC). Our SBP data appear in aggregate 
form; yet, we consider long-term performance data for individuals. We know participation rates 
by state and by school district. To combine these figures with individual performance data, we 
estimate probabilities. We use each individual's state of birth and residence and family 
background to estimate the probability that the student participated in the SBP. This probability 
is only an estimate. Hence, our regressor represents the number of SBP breakfasts that the 
student ate plus some random error of unknown magnitude. This error term will bias our 
estimated effect toward zero. School breakfasts might affect long-term performance, but the 
random error does not. Our estimated effect represents a weighted average of the breakfast effect 
and the random error effect. 
The NLSY79 includes responses from a random sample of 12,686 individuals aged 14-21 in 
1979. The NLSY79 includes responses from the initial 1979 survey and from seventeen follow-
up surveys from 1980 to 1998.77 Respondents answer questions on a variety of topics including 
family background and academic performance. With the Geocode file, we can connect 
respondents' answers to those respondents' states and counties of birth and residence. We will 
evaluate respondents' education levels as a function of our SBP proxy as well as a number of 
control variables. 
Composition of Respondents 
The NLSY79 respondent population includes a representative sample of about 6,111 members of 
the US population born between 1957 and 1965. In addition to this representative sample, the 
NLSY79 contains a supplemental sample and a military sample. The supplemental sample 
includes 5,295 black, Hispanic, and poor non-black non-Hispanic Americans born between 1957 
and 1965. The military sample includes 1,280 military personnel born between 1957 and 1961. 
In 1985, NLSY79 dropped the majority of the respondents from the military supplement, leaving 
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201 (15.7%) eligible respondents from the original military sample. In 1991, the NLSY79 
dropped the poor non-black, non-Hispanic respondents from the supplemental sample, leaving 
3,652 (69.0%) eligible respondents from the original supplemental sample. 
Of the 9,964 (78.5%) remaining eligible respondents, 8,399 (84.3%) completed the survey in 
1998. Ofthose not interviewed in 1998, 731 (7.3%) declined to be interviewed, and 295 (3.0%) 
died. Additionally, the NORC marked 725 (7.3%) difficult or impossible to locate, and the 
NORC did not interview 136 (1.4%) for reasons not disclosed. 
Equations and Variables 
In this section, we describe the equations and the variables that we use in our two empirical 
models. In our first model, we explore the SBP's effect on attendance in the current year. We 
use statewide aggregate figures for both attendance and SBP participation. In our second model, 
we explore SBP participation in kindergarten through 2nd grade as it affects individual 
respondents' future education levels. 
Modell: Attendance in SBP Schools 
Our hypothesis suggests that, all else equal, students who participate in the SBP attend school 
more often. In order to test the SBP's attendance effect, we use state-level attendance and 
enrollment variables from the USDA SBP data set. In order to create our performance variable, 
APEs, I> we divide ADA in SBP schools by enrollment in SBP schools. This quotient tells us the 
fraction of enrolled students who come to school in a given state on a given day. We multiply 
this fraction by 180, the length of a typical school year. By doing so, we can more easily 
compare ,our performance variable with our independent SBP variable, BPEs,l. 
+ U14,s,t 
77 Annual, excluding 1995 and 1997. 
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(16) LAPEs,1 = 1tI + 1t2*LBPEs,1 + 1t3*LPPEs,1 + 1t4*LTPENRs,l1 + 1t5,d*States,d+ 1t6,d*Year"d 
+ 1t7*UI6,s,l-1 + UI6,s,1 
(17) LAPEs,1 = PI + P2*LBNPs,1 + P3*LBMPs,1 + P4*LTPENRs,1 + P5,d*States,d+ P6,d*Year
"
d 
+ P7*U17,s,I-l + UI7,s,l 
AP ES,I represents 180 times ADA in SBP schools divided by enrollment in SBP schools for a 
given state and year. BPEs,1 represents the total number of breakfasts served divided by the 
enrollment in SBP schools in a given state and year. PPEs,1 represents 180 times the number of 
participants in the SBP divided by enrollment in SBP schools in the state. TPENRs,1 represents 
the total number of public school teachers K-12 in the state divided by total enrollment in the 
state. LBNPs,1 represents the sum of the natural logs of BPEs,1 and PPEs,l. LBMPs,l represents the 
difference of the natural logs of BPEs,l and PPEs,l. A variable preceded by "L" denotes the 
natural log of that variable. Finally, we consider state dummies, year dummies, and a serial 
correlation term. Subscript d indicates vectors of dummies. 
Our model covers the years from 1974 to 1995. Our data set is bounded from below by USDA 
enrollment figures; the USDA did not begin to track enrollment in SBP schools until 1974. Our 
data set is bounded from above by NCES teacher and enrollment figures. The NCES has not 
published data for public K-12 teachers and enrollment that are more recent than 1995. We use 
pooled least squares estimation for our regressions. 
Our dependent variable and our first two independent variables range from 0 to 180. In order to 
obtain comparable coefficients, we multiplied ADA and SBP Participants each by 180 over 
Enrollment to obtain APEs,1 and PPEs,l. Intuitively, we explain APEs,l as the average number of 
days that an enrolled student attends school in a given state and year. We interpret PPEs,1 as the 
number of SBP "participant days" divided by enrollment in SBP schools. If every participant ate 
a school breakfast every school morning, then BPEs,1 would equal PPEs,l. Figure 3 on page 88 
(not to scale) illustrates some of our variables in a Venn-Diagram. Figure 3 describes enrollment, 
ADA, and SBP participation for a single day. In our model, we consider the sums of many of 
these variables over the entire year. 
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The variables, BPEs,/ and PPEs.1 tell us infonnation about students' behavior. We would like to 
measure the difference in attendance between two otherwise equal students who consume 
different numbers of school breakfasts. Students who choose participate in the SBP might 
already be different from students who choose not to participate. Our dependent variable may 
capture some of these preexisting differences among students. The type of student who 
participates in the SBP might already be the type who attends school more often. For instance, 
early risers might participate in the SBP and attend school more often than average students do. 
Our state dummies should capture much of this effect. If a state contains more motivated 
students or more students who wake up early, we expect this difference to persist over time. In 
this case, state effects would suffice to capture this variation. Generally, APEs, 1 increased from 
1974 to 1995. Our year effects and serial correlation should capture the differences in children's 
behavior over the time period. To the extent that our fixed effects do not capture the differences 
in students, our model might bias the coefficients for BPEs,/ and PPEs,/ upward. For instance, we 
might observe some systematic correlation between SBP participation and school attendance 
policies. In this case, we would capture existing differences among the student population and 
we would attribute them to SBP participation. Our model controls for fixed-effects. Our model 
assumes that any correlation between AP Es,l and either BP ES •1 or P P Es,/ results from the SBP's 
attendance effect. 
In Equation (13), the coefficient for BPEs., tells us roughly how many more children show up with 
each breakfast served. For instance, we might mUltiply the coefficient by 10, and we would know 
how many more children attend if we serve 10 additional breakfasts. Once we include PPEs.1 in 
our model, in Equation (14), our SBP effect becomes less intuitive. The two variables represent 
different changes in the SBP. In Equation (14), when we increase BPEs,l, we increase the number 
of breakfasts served while holding the number of participants constant. Any child who eats one 
school breakfast in the school year counts as an SBP participant. Not every SBP participant eats 
180 school breakfasts in a school year. We see from the data in our empirical model that, on 
average, participants from the average state from 1974-1995 consumed 166 breakfasts. When we 
increase P P ES.I> we increase the number of SBP participants while holding the number of 
breakfasts served constant. Including PPEs,1 gives us two SBP variables measuring different 
effects. Our first independent variable, BPEs,1> tells us how much the SBP affects existing 
participants. If BPEs" increases, existing participants consume more breakfasts, and we see 
whether or not attendance increases. If so, we conclude that some SBP participants would not 
have come to school if not for the SBP. 
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Our second independent variable, PPEs,/, tells us how much the SBP affects new participants. If 
we increase PPEs,/ but hold BPEs,/ constant, we measure two simultaneous effects. We increase 
the number of participants in the SBP, but we lower the number of meals per participant. Hence, 
we take some meals from our existing participants, and we give them to our new participants. 
Our statistical models do not predict an effect for PPEs,l holding BPEs,/ constant. Previous studies 
have not differentiated between existing participants and new participants. Hence, we cannot 
make definite predictions about the coefficient for P P Es,l. 
We would like to know the effect of adding participants (increasing PPEs,l) while holding meals 
per participant constant. We do not consider meals per participant in our model because the 
number is not scaled correctly; it contains participants in the denominator. In order to understand 
this relationship better, we consider the log estimations in Equations (15) through (17), where the 
coefficients represent elasticities. The numerator for the coefficient represents percentage change 
in our dependent variable. The denominator represents percent change in the independent 
variable in question. 
The coefficient for LBPEs,1 in Equation (15) tells us the elasticity of the total attendance effect of 
the SBP. This coefficient gives us the percentage increase in attendance divided by the 
percentage increase in breakfasts served. In order to understand the effect of P P Es,/ on AP Es,/, we 
consider Equation (16). When we increase the number of participant days by 10%, let us increase 
BPEs,/ by 10%, as well. We have 10% more participants. If each one eats the average number of 
meals per participant, then the number of meals divided by enrollment also increases by 10%. To 
consider the combined effect ofthis change, we simply add together the two coefficients for 
LBPEs,/ and LPPEs,/. We expect this combined effect to be positive. We can compare the 
coefficient for LBP Es,1 with the sum of the coefficients for LBP Es,/ and LP P Es,/ in order to 
compare these two different aspects of the SBP. 
Equation (17) produces the same sum of squared residuals as Equation (16) produces. The two 
models are mathematically equivalent, but the coefficients and standard errors provide different 
sorts of information in the two models. The sum of the coefficients, P2 and P3, in Equation (17) 
should equal1t2 from Equation (16). The difference of the coefficients, P2 and P3, in Equation 
(17) should equal1t3 from Equation (16). We observe this conversion in Figure 3, above. By 
substitution, 1t2 + 1t3, the coefficient for the combined effect described in the above paragraph, is 
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equal to (P2 + P3) + (P2 - P3) = 2*P2' Hence, we can compute the standard error of our combined 
effect by halving the standard error for P2. 
We expect a positive coefficient for TPENRs,t. All else equal, we expect that a school with more 
teachers per student offers more attention and support to its students. If a school offers more 
attention and support to its students, we expect that children will show up more often. Teacher-
pupil ratios proxy for school quality. TPENRs,1 might also capture variation in the income or 
education level in state s and year t that fixed effects do not capture. We expect that children 
from more affluent or more highly educated families attend school more often. These children's 
families might place greater emphasis on education. This effect, along with the incentive effect 
for school quality, might lead to higher average attendance in schools with more teachers per 
pupil. 
TPENRs,t ranges from 0.039 to 0.079. When we divide the mean of TEACHERSs,1 by the mean of 
ENROLLs.l , we obtain 0,054. Hence, yearly state averages for pupil-teacher ratios range from 13 
to 27, with the observations averaging to 18 pupils per teacher. Note that we use a different 
denominator for TPENRs,1 than we use for the SBP variables. Our dependent variable and our two 
SBP variables contain information about SBP schools by state. We would like to know teacher-
pupil ratios for the SBP schools in a state in a given year. The USDA does not keep track of that 
information. Consequently, we proxy for that variable with teacher-pupil ratios across the entire 
state in a given state and year. Hence, TPENRs,1 describes teacher-pupil ratios in SBP schools and 
non-SBP schools alike. 
Using the statewide aggregate figures for teacher-pupil ratios creates another errors in variables 
problem.78 Our teacher-pupil ratio represents the teacher-pupil ratio in state-year s,t plus some 
error term. This error biases our coefficient toward zero. Let us consider state-year observation 
A, containing some very affluent school districts with very high teacher-pupil ratios. Imagine 
too, that the poorer schools in observation A had average levels for teacher-pupil teacher ratios. 
Let us also consider state-year observation B with average teacher-pupil ratios across the entire 
state. Observation A shows a higher TPENRs,t than does observation B. Nevertheless, when we 
consider teacher-pupil ratios among the poorer schools, which are more likely to participate in the 
SBP, the two observations are identical. Controlling for other variables, we have no reason to 
expect that observation A will have a higher value for APE,·,I' APEs,1 measures attendance in SBP 
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schools, where the teacher-pupil ratios are identical for observations A and B. In the situation 
described above, TPENRs,/ captured differences in non-SBP schools. When we looked at the SBP 
schools to measure the attendance effect, we saw no effect. We might conclude that teacher-pupil 
ratios do not affect attendance. In actuality, we have simply used the wrong variable to measure 
teacher-pupil ratios in SBP schools. 
TPENRs,/ works as a rough estimate of teacher-pupil ratios in SBP schools. In many cases, 
differences in TPENRs,/ actually will capture differences in teacher-pupil ratios across SBP 
schools in different states. In these cases, TP ENRs,/ effectively measures teacher-pupil ratios as 
they affect attendance in SBP schools. If teacher-pupil ratios distribute across SBP schools and 
non-SBP schools equally, then TPENRs,/ will really capture variation in teacher-pupil ratios in 
SBP schools. The more teacher-pupil ratios are distributed equally across SBP schools and non-
SBP schools, the better TPENRs,/ works as a proxy. Assuming that teacher-pupil ratios among 
SBP schools and non-SBP schools are not distributed perfectly equally, our coefficients are 
biased toward zero. Let us consider the difference between teacher-pupil ratios in SBP schools 
and those in non-SBP schools. As long as the variance for this difference exceeds zero, we have 
biased our coefficient toward zero. This bias holds regardless of the direction of the inequality, 
and it even holds if the expected value of this difference is zero. As mentioned earlier, we 
encounter a similar problem with our independent SBP variables in our second model, below. In 
addition to this bias, we expect that the state- and year-dummies duplicate much of the variation 
in TP ENRs,/. 
In addition to various fonns of BPEs,[' PPEs,[' and TPENRs,t, our model also includes fixed 
state- and year- effects and a serial correlation tenn. We omit New York State for comparison. 
Our state effects should capture much of the variation due to race, income, average education 
level, and other measures of school quality. Because our dummies capture this variation, we 
expect that a number ofthese variables would not show significant effects in our fixed-effects 
model. Future researchers might choose to test this premise by including such variables. 
Model 2: Educational Attainment and High School Graduation 
78 We described our first errors-in-variables problem when we described our SBP proxy for Model 2a. 
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Our second model divides into two sections. In the first section, we evaluate the SBP's effect on 
students' education levels. In the second section, we use these results to form crude estimates of 
the SBP's income effect. 
Model 2a: The SBP and Educational Attainment 
Our hypothesis suggests that, all else equal, students who participate in the SBP complete more 
grades of school than non-SBP participants do. Equations (18) and (20) explore the effect of the 
SBP on the highest grade that each respondent completed. In Equations (19) and (21), we explore 
the effect of the SBP on the probability that a given respondent graduated from high school. 
(18) HGC; = crl*FBPA; + cr2*HGCMOM; + cr3*IPF; + cr4*CTMEDINC; + cr5*BLACK; 
+ cr6*MALE; + cr7*RESPONSEAGEj8; + cr8*RESPAGE; + cr9,t*Cohort;,1 
+ crlO,s * BState;,s + UI8,; 
(19) HSDUM; = T,I*FBPA; + T,2*HGCMOM; + T,3*INCOME78; + T,4*CTMEDINC; 
+ T,5*BLACK; + T,6*MALE; + T,7*RESPONSEAGEj8; + T,8*RESPAGE; 
+ T,9,t*Cohort;,1 + T,IO,s * BState;,s + U19,; 
(20) HGC; = ul*BNP; + u2*BMP; + u3*HGCMOM; + u4*IPF; 
+ u5*CTMEDINC; + U6* BLACK; + U7* MALE; + U8* RESPONSEAGE j 8; 
+ U9* RESPAGE; + ulo/Cohort;,1 + UII,s * BState;,s + U20,; 
(21) HSDUM; = Ij>I * BNP; + 1j>2 * BMP; + 1j>3 * HGCMOM; + 1j>4 * INCOME78; 
+ 1j>5*CTMEDINC; + 1j>6*BLACK; + 1j>7*MALE; + Ij>s*RESPONSEAGE_18; 
+ 1j>9*RESPAGE; + Ij>IO/Cohort;,1 + Ij>II,s*BState;,s + U21 ,i 
HGC; represents the highest grade that the respondent completed. HSDUM; returns a "1" if HGC; 
is greater than or equal to 12, and a "0" otherwise. Rather than include a constant term in our 
regression, we include dummies for all four cohorts. These four dummies add up to a vector of 
716 ones. to obtain the constant term for Equations (19) through (21), we can take a weighted 
average of the coefficients for these four dummies. For Equations (18) and (20), we calculate 
OLS estimates. For Equations (19) and (21), we use logit models. FBPA; represents Free 
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Breakfasts Served divided by ADA in respondent i's state for the years from kindergarten to 
second grade. PPA; (not included above) represents total SBP Participants divided by ADA in 
respondent i's state for the years from kindergarten to second grade. BNP; represents the sum of 
FBPA; divided by its own mean and PPA; divided by its own mean. BMP; represents the 
difference of FBPA; divided by its own mean and PPA; divided by its own mean. 
HGCMOM; represents the highest grade that respondent i's mother completed. INCOME78; 
represents respondent i's family's income in 1978. IPF; represents respondent i's family income 
in 1979 divided by respondent i's family size in 1979. CTMEDINC; represents the median family 
income in 1969 in the county in which respondent i was born. BLACK; returns a "1" if 
respondent i is black and a "0" if respondent i is not black. MALE; returns a "I" if respondent i is 
male and a "0" if respondent i is female. 
RESPONSEAGE_18; returns a "I" if respondent i was 18 at the most recent response to "What is 
the highest grade that you completed?" RESPAGE; represents respondent i's age at hislher most 
recent response to the same question. 
Our model also includes fixed cohort- and state-effects. The cohort dummies, AGE j 4; through 
AGE_17;, correspond to respondents' ages in 1979. Our model only includes 4 age cohorts, so 
our 4 cohort-dummies sum to one. Consequently, the weighted average of the cohort-effects 
represents the constant term in our regression. In order to compute this term, we would first 
multiply each of the cohort-dummies by the number of respondents in the cohort. Next, we add 
these products together, and we divide the sum by the total number of respondents. To compute 
the significance of a single cohort effect, we would first subtract our constant term from the 
cohort effect. 
We also include 41 birth-state dummies. Our sample does not include any respondents from 
Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Maine, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Rhode Island, or 
Wyoming. Furthermore, we omit New York State for the purposes of comparison. State effect s 
represents the difference in the average HGC; or HSD UM; between respondents from New York 
and respondents from state s. Our data include one response for each individual; hence, our 
model does not include a serial correlation term. 
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Restrictions Placed on the Sample Population 
For the purposes of our study, we reduce our 12,686-person sample with a number of constraints. 
The NLSY79 does not include respondents' parents' incomes. The survey does, on the other 
hand, include a variable for family income. If the respondent lived in a parental home in the 
survey year, then family income includes parents' income. For this reason, we include 
respondent's only ifthat respondent replied that he/she lived in a parental home in 1979. The 
NLSY79 does not strictly define "parental home." If a respondent lived with one parent, we 
expect that the respondent answered that he/she lived in a parental home. If the respondent lived 
with a legal guardian who was not a biological parent, then the survey leaves the question open 
for interpretation. Among respondents living in parental homes, we selected those whose family 
incomes fell below the poverty line in 1978. These restrictions narrowed our sample from 12,686 
to 2,465 respondents. We use this poverty restriction to proxy for free meal eligibility 6-17 year 
earlier.79 As mentioned on page 20, Akin and others' research suggests that school lunches affect 
these children more than they affect non-poor children. This difference mayor may not carry 
over to the SBP. If it does, then our estimates only reflect the SBP's effect on poor children. 
We place a variety of other restrictions on the sample population. We describe the reasons for 
these restrictions in the next few paragraphs. We restrict the sample population to include only 
those respondents who lived in their respective states of birth at age 14. We include only those 
respondents who were aged 14-17 in 1979. We remove every respondent who did not disclose 
the highest grade that he/she completed sometime after the age of 17. We remove respondents 
from the sample if they did not answer every question used in our model. We also remove 8 
respondents from our model because they did not answer "Did you live with both biological 
parents from birth until age 18?" We do not end up using this variable in our final specification 
because it did not significantly affect our dependent variables. Nevertheless, we should not 
expect that the omission of these 8 respondents biases our estimates in any way. Our final sample 
includes 716 respondents. 
Education Level 
79 Once we restrict the age-cohorts in our model, this restriction proxies form free meal eligibility 6-11 
years earlier. 
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For the purposes of our model, we use two dependent variables, HGC; and HSDUM;. HGC; 
denotes the highest grade that respondent i completed. HSDUM; returns a one if respondent i 
completed 12th grade or higher and a zero if the respondent did not complete 12th grade. 
The NLSY79 includes responses to "Highest Grade Completed" for every survey year. As 
described on page 43, respondents dropped offfrom the survey for various reasons. We remove 
every respondent who did not answer this question after the age of 17. We observe much lower 
mean values for HGC; and HSDUM; for this younger subset of the sample population. We expect 
that a large proportion of these younger respondents completed more years of schooling shortly 
after they answered the survey question. 
Our remaining respondents disclosed their education levels anytime between the ages of 18 and 
33. Even after eliminating the youngest responses, we find that HGC; and HSDUM; vary 
according to the age of the respondent. Hence, we include the two variables, 
RESPONSEAGE j 8; and RESPAGE; to control for this variation. RESPONSEAGE j 8; returns a 
one if respondent i answered "Highest Grade Completed" at age 18 and a zero otherwise. This 
variable controls for 18-year-olds who eventually gradu~ted high school but completed the survey 
before they graduated. RESPAGE; denotes the age, between 18 and 36, of respondent i when 
he/she reported hislher education level. 
RESPAGE; operates largely independently from the age-cohort effect. Imagine two respondents, 
both been born in 1963. One drops off from the survey in 1985, while the other stays in the 
survey through 1998. RESPAGE; for the first respondent equals 22, while RESPAGE; for the 
second respondent equals 35. Birth years for our age-cohorts have a range of three, while 
RESP AGE; has a range of 18. 
RESPAGE; captures two effects. Older respondents have had more of an opportunity to complete 
more years of schooling. Some respondents may have completed high school or the equivalent 
some time between the ages of 18 and 33. Others may have attended school at higher or lower 
levels of education during those years. We also expect that some of the respondents 
misrepresented their education levels as they aged in order to appear more educated. We do not 
isolate these two effects. RESPAGE; controls for both effects. We have no reason to think that 
either of the RESPAGE; effects can be attributed to the SBP. 
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SBP Variables 
The NLSY79 survey does not include questions about the SBP. Hence, we estimate the 
probability that each respondent participated in the SBP using annual statewide aggregate data. 
In order to estimate this probability, we would like to know the state and years in which each 
respondent attended school. 
We restrict our sample population to include only those respondents who lived in their respective 
states of birth at age 14. Consequently, our state-level SBP variable more accurately represents 
breakfasts served in the state in which respondent i attended grades K-2. Our SBP data require 
that we link every respondent to the state in which the respondent attended school. While that 
particular variable is not available, we can proxy for it with each respondent's state of birth. 
We restrict our sample population to include only those respondents who were aged 14-17 in 
1979. These students were born between 1962 and 1965, and they attended kindergarten between 
the years of 1967 and 1970. Respondents took the NLSY79 at different points during t~e year. 
We assume that respondents took the survey earlier, rather than later, in the school year. Hence, 
if a respondent was aged 16 in 1979, we assume that he/she entered kindergarten 11 years earlier 
in 1968. This assumption creates a bias in our estimates. Ifa respondent has an early birthday, 
then our model may assume that the respondent began school one year earlier than he/she actually 
did. The SBP increased over the period in question, so we assume that these students consumed 
fewer breakfasts than they actually did. Angrist and Krueger (1991) show that students with 
birthdays later in the school year are less likely to drop out of school. Laws allow these students 
to drop out of school early. Hence, this assumption about student ages may bias our estimates 
upward. We think students drop out of school because they had fewer breakfasts. In fact, these 
students simply have birthdays early in the school year, which predisposes them to dropping out 
of school. We do not know the average birthday for respondents in our sample. Hence, we 
cannot definitely conclude that this assumption creates an upward bias. Some students have early 
birthdays, but some students begin kindergarten at age 6. 
The SBP began halfway through the 1967 school year. Hence, the SBP program and the cohort 
effects are confounded for all respondents born before 1962. All the respondents in the military 
sample were 18 years of age or older in 1979. Hence, by eliminating the older age-cohorts, we 
also eliminate all those respondents from the military sample. Recall that we have already 
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restricted our sample to include only those students living in a parental home in 1979. If our 
sample included respondents aged 18 or older in 1979, then our sample restrictions would select 
for specific traits in those respondents. Requiring that these respondents lived in parental homes 
in 1979 excludes all respondents who moved away to work or to attend college. 
We have restricted the sample population to include only those respondents whose parents lived 
at or below the poverty line in 1978. Consequently, we assume that all the respondents in our 
population met the income eligibility requirements for free breakfasts. 
We do not know precisely whether or not our individual respondents participated in the SBP. 
Our models use three variables to describe the SBP in respondent's respective states. Equations 
(18) and (19) use FBP A;. FBP A; represents free breakfasts served divided by attendance in 
respondent i's state for the years from kindergarten to second grade. First, we add together SBP 
statistics from K-2. Second, we add the ADA statistics from K-2. Finally, we divide the sum of 
SBP statistics by the sum of ADA statistics to obtain FBP A;. Equation (20) and (21) include 
linear transformations of FBP A; and P P A;. P PA; represents the sum of the number of SBP 
participants divided by the sum of ADAs for the years from K-2. We use a simple, unweighted 
sum for the years K-2 for both FBPA; and PPA;. Future researchers could work to estimate the 
appropriate weights for relevant years. The sum, BNP;, and the difference, BMP;, help us to 
evaluate the effect of increasing FBPA; and P PA; simultaneously. These transformations are 
analogous to LBNPs,1 and LBMPs,,, which help us to understand the effects of a simultaneous 
change in Modell. 
FBP A; and P PA; provide information about the relative size of the SBP in each respondent's state 
during the years from K-2. Our 716 respondents do not constitute a representative sample of the 
US, or of their respective states. If they did, then FBPA; would represent the expected number of 
free breakfasts that respondent i consumed. Similarly, P P A; would represent the probability that 
respondent i participated in the SBP. With our existing sample, FBP A; and P PA; do not pertain as 
directly to our respondents. The two variables simply provide information about the relative size 
of the SBP for the state and years in which respondent i attended K-2. Our SBP variables do not 
measure respondents' degree of SBP participation precisely. Our regressor is a linear function of 
our desired regressor (SBP participation) and an error term. Hence, as explained earlier, the 
effect that we measure will be biased toward zero. 
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.. -------------------------------------- ------
All of our respondents lived at or below 100% poverty in 1978. We assume that all of our 
respondents qualified for free meals during grades K-2. Hence, we assume that each of our 
respondents lived at or below 130% poverty for some specific three-year interval beginning 8-11 
years before 1978. Because our respondents are poor, our respondents are more likely than 
average to come from poor school districts. As noted in the introduction, the SBP is located 
disproportionately in poor school districts. The US government provides stronger incentives for 
schools to join the SBP if the schools fall within "special need" areas. We may conclude that our 
respondents are more likely to come from SBP schools than average students are. 
We also assume that all our respondents qualify to receive free breakfasts. Slightly more than 
half of our respondents are black. As noted on page 16, holding income constant, black students 
are more likely than non-black students are to participate in the SBP. Our respondents are not 
only more likely than average to come from SBP schools. Those of our respondents who 
attended SBP schools were more likely to participate in the SBP than were average SBP school 
students. 
Not all of our respondents have participated in the SBP or have attended SBP schools. Among 
those who participated, changes in FBP Ai and P P Ai may correspond to changes in HGC; and 
HSDUM;. Among those who did not participate in the SBP or attend SBP schools, changes in 
FBP Ai and P P Ai do not correspond to changes in HGC; and HSD UM;. We have no reason to 
suspect that the SBP affects non-participants. Our coefficients fall below what our coefficients 
would be if every respondent participated in the SBP. Our coefficients represent weighted 
averages of averages of academic effects of the SBP for those who participated and zeros for 
those who did not participate. Our coefficient for FBP Ai represents the change in highest grade 
completed or HSDUM; divided by the change in the number of breakfasts served. Our coefficient 
for FBPAi is a downward-biased estimator of the academic effect to a student of serving a 
breakfast to that student. 
Again, our set of716 respondents does not constitute a representative sample of students from 
their respective birth-states over the period in question. If we did use such a representative 
sample, then our coefficient would represent the SBP's academic effect distributed over the entire 
population. In this case, we would multiply our coefficient by 180 over PPAi. We scale by 180 
so that our denominator becomes Participants/ADA rather than Participant Days/ADA. We 
assume that non-participants experience no academic benefits from the SBP. When we multiply 
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our coefficient by ADA, we obtain the SBP's total academic effect on everyone. If we knew the 
number of participants in our sample, we could then divide this total effect by the number of 
persons affected. As we have sufficiently established above, our respondents are more likely to 
participate in the SBP than average students are. P P A; over 180 does not accurately measure the 
proportion of participants in our sample. Even if it did, we still use a representative sample rather 
than the entire SBP population. Hence, our estimates would still suffer from errors-in-variables, 
biasing our coefficients toward zero. 
We have established that our coefficient for FBP A; falls below the academic effect that results 
from giving a student a breakfast. We have also established that our coefficient for FBPA; 
probably exceeds the value of that same academic effect distributed over the population. If, 
however, our errors-in-variables problem exerts sufficient bias in our model, then our estimate 
might fall below the population effect. Nevertheless, 180* FBPA; divided by PPA; probably 
overshoots the academic effect that results from giving a student a breakfast. Because we do not 
know the number of SBP participants in our sample, we cannot detennine a precise estimate of 
the academic effect of one breakfast. Our estimates can, however, provide us with confidence 
intervals for upper and lower bounds for this effect. Our upper bound is still biased downward 
because of errors in variables. If, at a later date, we choose to relax the restrictions on our sample 
population, we could estimate the SBP's academic effect directly. We would still have to 
contend with the errors-in-variables problem, though. 
When we described Modell, we considered the possibility that students were already different 
before they joined the SBP. For instance, we imagined that early risers participated more in the 
SBP, and that early risers perfonned better in school. We speculated that our model would catch 
these existing differences in students and attribute them to the SBP. In Modell, we used states as 
our units of observation, and we used state- and year-effects to control for any such differences. 
In Model 2, we use individual respondents as our units of observation, but this bias still does not 
concern us. If such differences in people vary by state, then our state-effects control for these 
differences. If these differences do not vary by state, then our state-level SBP data do not capture 
the individual differences at all. Our state-level data do not attribute individual respondents' 
idiosyncrasies to the SBP, because our state-level data only capture state- and year-level trends. 
Our first two models describe educational attainment, measured with HGC; or HSDUM;, as 
functions of the number of breakfasts served. Equations (20) and (21) attempt to distinguish two 
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separate effects of the SBP, much like LBNPs,l and LBMPs" distinguished two separate attendance 
effects in Modell. When we model Equations (19) through (21) in log form, we find that our 
regressions do not fit the data as well. Many of our variables exert significant effects in linear 
form, but not in log form. We conclude that linear variables more accurately model the effects 
that we wish to measure. Nevertheless, we include regression results for our log formulations in 
Table 15.80 
Our log formulations do not yield significant effects. Nevertheless, we would still like to 
measure the effects of increasing PPAi while holding FBPA/PADAKT2T; constant. We explain 
our reasons for holding breakfasts per participant constant when we describe Modell. When we 
consider P P Ai and FBP Ai as separate variables, the coefficient for P P Ai reports the effect of 
increasing SBP participation holding breakfasts constant. By increasing PPAi and holding FBPA j 
constant, we perform two simultaneous and contradictory operations. We increase the number of 
SBP participants, but we lower the average number of meals that each participant receives. We 
have essentially taken breakfasts from old participants and given those breakfasts to new 
participants. Rather than measure the upshot of these contradictory operations, we wish to give 
breakfasts to new participants and to leave old participants alone. When we increase participation 
by 10%, we would like to increase breakfasts by 10%. We would like to give our new 
participants just as many breakfasts as our old participants have. In doing so, we can see how the 
SBP affects new and old participants differently. Because our model uses linear, and not log, 
variables we cannot use the same technique as we used in Model l . 
We would like a linear variable that captures simultaneous changes in FBP Ai and P P Ai that are 
equal in proportion. This variable does not exist; we cannot capture a geometric operation with 
an arithmetic variable. We can create a linear variable that captures simultaneous changes in 
FBPA j and PPA j that are equal in proportion at a single point. We model the combined effect of 
changes in FBPA; and P P A j with a similar technique as we used in Modell. In Modell, we used 
logs, so that the coefficient for LBNPs,l captured simultaneous changes equal in proportion at 
every point. In Equations (20) and (21) we use two independent variables, BNP j and BMP j , both 
defined as functions of FBP A j and P PA j • As mentioned earlier, BNPj represents the sum of 
80 In revising the paper, we discovered that CTMEDINCj and RESPAGEj exert more significant effects on 
HGC j when logged. Logging the variables slightly increases our estimated coefficient for FBPA j (from 
0.247 to 0.255) and our adjusted R2 (from 0.192 to 0.200). Logging RESPAGEj in the HSDUMj equation 
adds some slight significance to the RESPAGEj coefficient and does not affect our other estimates. We use 
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FBP A j divided by its own mean and P P A j divided by its own mean. BMPj represents the 
difference of FBP A j divided by its own mean and P P A j divided by its own mean. In Equations 
(20) and (21), we regress HGCj and HSDUM; on both BNPj and BMPj • These equations are 
mathematically equivalent to equations in which we regress HGCj and HSDUM; on both FBPA j 
and PPA j • We distribute the coefficients in Equations (20) and (21) over the sum, BNPj , and the 
difference, BMPj , and combine terms. Doing so, we can manipulate Equations (20) and (21) to 
obtain linear regressions of HGCj and HSDUM; on FBP A j and P PA j • 
Figure 5 illustrates the rationale behind our technique. Let FBP A j = Xj, P P A j = Zj, and Yi = HGCj 
or HSDUM;. We may add as many other variables to this equation as we like, so long as they do 
not contain Xj or Zj. When we take the derivative of both sides with respect to w, tJ.Y/tJ.Wj equals 
2*b l . We evaluate Equations (20) and (21) at the mean values for FBPA j and PPA j ,. Hence, 2*b l 
in Figure 5 corresponds to 2*uI and 2*$\, respectively. 
Heuristically, UI and $1 represent coefficients for the aggregated effected of changing FBP A j and 
PPA j simultaneously. On the same level, we can interpret U2 and $2 as coefficients for the effect 
of changing the relative sizes of the two variables. Indeed, this interpretation is totally valid for 
linear changes in FBPA j and PPA j • Our hypothesis only applies to the mean for both FBPA j and 
P P Aj, though. Only at that point does a simultaneous change of equal proportion only affect 
BNPj and not BMP j • 
For Equations (20) and (21), we test the hypothesis that the coefficient for BNPj exceeds zero at 
the means for FBPA j and PPA j • We would like to increase participation subject to the constraint 
that elasticity of breakfasts to participation equals one. Our hypothesis states that this change 
positively affects HGCj and HSDUM; when evaluated at the means for FBPA j and PPA j • The 
magnitudes of these effects equal2*uI and 2*$\, respectively. 
Control Variables 
HGCMOM; denotes the highest grade that respondent i's mother completed. T. Kane (1994) 
finds that, among black students, the mother's educational attainment better predicts high school 
graduation than does father's attainment. T. Kane also finds that, among black students, the 
the HSDU~ specification for our estimates in Model 2b. Hence, this increase does not alter our fmal 
estimates. 
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mother's attainment level predicts college entry better than the father's attainment does. For 
white students, however, the father's attainment level better predicts college entry than does the 
mother's attainment. Attainment levels between parents are highly correlated. T. Kane finds that 
both parents' attainment levels significantly affect black and white students' attainments, alike. J. 
Kane and Spizman (1994) find that the father's education exerts a larger effect than does the 
mother's education on the probability that a student enters college. 
T. Kane uses a series of eight dummies to represent the different education levels of each parent. 
These dummies indicate whether each parent had graduated high scho·ol, attended some college, 
completed college, or whether the respondent did not know. In our specification, we only 
consider the mother's attainment. Consequently, we only include observations in which the 
respondent reported the mother's education level in 1979.81 The mother's attainment level can 
serve as a proxy for both parents' education levels. By only using the mother's education, we 
need not restrict the model to respondents who know their respective fathers' education levels. 
By using HGCMOkL, we may exclude those respondents who grew up without mothers. 
However, we do not systematically exclude those respondents who grew up without fathers. 
We use different income measurements for the two equations. INCOME78 j represents respondent 
i's family's income in 1978. IP F j represents respondent's family income in 1978 divided by 
respondent i's family size in 1979. Individually, both variables show significant effects in both 
equations, but the variables are highly collinear. IPFj showed a slightly more significant effect in 
the HGCj equation, and INCOME78 j showed a slightly more significant effect in the HSDUkL 
equation. The two income variables emphasize different aspects of income's effect on 
attainment. INCOME78 j tells us more about the parents or the income-providers. This variable 
tells us about respondent i's role models just as HGCMOkL does. IP F j , on the other hand, tells us 
more about the resources available to the respondent. We expect that child with higher IP F j has 
more of an opportunity to attend college. The child has access to more resources. Using this 
logic,we might expect that IPFj would factor more significantly when our dependent variable 
contains information about college. This is, in fact, the case, and IPFj factors more significantly 
into the HGCj equation, while INCOME78 j factors more significantly into the HSDUkL equation. 
CTMEDINCj represents the median family income in 1969 in the county in which the respondent 
was born. As noted earlier, this county is not necessarily the county in which the respondent 
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lived at age 14. Nevertheless, the variable shows a high degree of explanatory power. Given 
INCOME78; or IPF;, we can explain CTMEDINC;'s negative coefficient by discussing relative 
income changes. Holding family income constant, as median county income decreases, the 
child's relative income increases. This relative increase in income could expose the child to more 
opportunities. 
As Table 6 illustrates, the racial composition of our 716-person sample does not reflect the racial 
composition of the US population. As described earlier, the NLSY79 contains a supplemental 
sample of black and Hispanic respondents over and above the representative sample of the US. 
We have further biased the sample by only including respondents who lived below the poverty 
level in 1978. No respondents in our sub-sample are Asian or Pacific American, and no 
respondents are both black and Hispanic. 
Model 2 does not use pooled data, but our model does include fixed cohort- and birth-state-
effects. The cohort-dummies, AGE j 4; through AGE _17;, correspond to each respondent' s age in 
1979. Our respondents vary by state and age-cohort so that these fixed effects become relevant, 
even for ordinary least squares and logit estimation. Our birth-state-effects should capture 
differences in school quality, income and price levels, demographics, family composition, and 
average level of education across states. Once we control for birth-state-effects, teacher-pupil 
ratios do not significantly affect HGCj or HSDUM;. 
\ 
Our sample covers a very small range of years. Consequently, we expect the cohort-effects to be 
relatively small. Nonetheless, the cohort effects may capture some of the variation in the 
economy and in school quality over the time period. For instance, the high school class of 1980 
may have faced a different job market than the high school class of 1983 did. These labor market 
changes might have affected students' incentives to complete more education. Cohort-effects 
might also capture nationwide changes in school expenditures, classroom size, and teacher quality 
over the four years. 
Other variables that did not contribute significantly to either equation include HISPANIC;, 
BOTHPARENTSj , FSIZE;, and MOMAGE;. HISPANIC; returns a one if respondent i is Hispanic 
and a zero otherwise. BOTHPARENTSj returns a one if respondent i lived with both parents from 
81 The NLSY79 allows respondents to consult with parents in order to answer questions more accurately. 
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birth until age 18 and a zero otherwise. FSIZE; represents the size of respondent i's family in 
1979, and MOMAGE; represents the age of respondent i's mother in 1987. 
Model 2b: The SBP and Labor Market Experience 
In the second section of our long-term effects model, we consider employment and earnings as 
dependent variables. By estimating the SBP's indirect effects on students' future employment 
and earnings prospects, we can determine crude costlbenefit ratios for the SBP. 
(22) EMP;= XI + X2*HSDUM; + 'X3*MALE; + X4,t*WYear;,1 + X6,s*RState;.s + X7,s*BState;.s 
(23) EMP;= 'VI + 'V2*HSDUM;+ 'V3*BLACK; + 'V4*MALE;+ 'Vs*AGE; 
+ 'V6*(WREMP/WRPOP;) + U23,; 
(24) !og(WAGE/CPI;) = COl + co2*HSDUM; + co3*HGCMOM; + co4*IPF; + cos*MALE; 
+ C06* BLACK; + C07* AGE; + cos,s * RState;.s + C09,s * BState;.s + U24,; 
WAGE; represents the wage rate at respondent i's current or most recent job. EMP; returns a "1" 
if respondent i had a job in the survey week and a "0" otherwise. The NLSY79 survey contained 
these questions for every year from 1979 to 1993. Some respondents skipped one or both ofthe 
questions for some ofthe survey years. WAGE; represents respondent i's most recent response to 
the wage question. EMP; represents respondent i's answer to the employment question for the 
same year as ;' s most recent answer to the wage question. Equation (24) includes only those 
respondents for whom EMP; equals one. Different respondents reported their most recent wage 
rates in different survey years, from 1981 to 1993. We deflate our wage observations with the 
Consumer Price Index. Hence, we measure our wage observations in 1983 dollars per hour.s2 
Log denotes natural log. AGE; represents respondent ;'s age for the wage/employment 
observation in question. WREMP/WRPOP; represents the employment-population ratio for 
respondent ;'s race and age category in hislher state of residence in the survey year.S3 We 
estimate Equations (22) and (23) with a logit model, and we estimate Equation (24) using OLS. 
Recall from our discussion ofModel2a that we obtain HGCj and HSDUM; from respondent i's 
82 Approximately. cpr for 1983 equals 99.6, and the average cpr for 1982-1984 equals 100. 
83 Race categories include white, black, and Hispanic. Age categories include 16-19, 20-24, and 25-34. 
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most recent report of hislher education level. Respondents reported their education levels as late 
as 1998. Hence, a one for HSDUM; might reflect that respondent i completed high school after 
i's most recent wage observation. In order to preserve consistency, we do not update HSDUM; to 
fit our new model. Hence, we may observe wages or employment statuses for non-high school 
graduates and attribute them to high school graduates. If so, then our model contains another 
errors-in-variables problem. This problem may bias our HSDUM; coefficients downward. 
We expect positive signs for HSDUM; and for MALE; in all three equations. We expect that high 
school graduates are more likely to be employed than non-graduates are. Among employed 
persons, we expect that high school graduates earn more than non-graduates do. In fact, in 
constructing this model, we aim to estimate these positive returns to schooling. All else equal, we 
expect that men are more likely to be employed than women are. Women who keep house and 
raise children full-time return a zero for EMP;. We also expect that, among employed persons, all 
else equal, men earn higher wages than women do. We can attribute this difference to direct 
discrimination. We expect negative coefficients for BLACK; in Equations (23) and (24) because 
of direct discrimination. We expect positive coefficients for AGE; in Equations (23) and (24), 
because older workers have more experience. All else equal, workers with more experience 
demand higher wages and are more likely to be employed. Traditionally, wages and employment 
vary quadratically with age. At higher age levels, the returns to a year of age decrease as 
experience and education loses its relevance. In our sample, however, age ranges from 16 to 31. 
Our sample does not include any respondents at the higher age levels where wages and 
employment decrease with age. AGE? does not show a significant effect on either dependent 
variable. We conclude that !og(WAGE/CPI;) and EMP;'s concavity with respect to AGE; is 
negligible and can be sufficiently approximated with a linear relationship. Hence, we do not 
expect wages or employment to vary quadratically with age for our sample. We expect positive 
coefficients for (WREMP/WRPOP;) in Equation (23) and HGCMOM; and IPF; in Equation (24). 
Higheremploymentlpopulation ratios for i's demographic group should increase the likelihood 
that i is employed. HGCMOM; and IPF; represent opportunities available to i as a child. These 
two variables might also capture i' s parents' roles as role models and as standards of 
performance. We expect that respondents from more educated or affluent families earn more 
than average and are more likely than average to be employed. 
In addition to our descriptive regressors, Equation (22) includes state- and year-dummies and 
Equation (24) includes state-dummies. The state-dummies in Equations (22) and (24) include 
62 
birth-state-dummies and dummies for the respondent's state of residence in the survey year. We 
exclude those dummies that make our models perfectly multicollinear. As before, we do not 
include dummies for New York State. Because of this perfect multicollinearity, we know that we 
have controlled for the same variation with other variables in our model. We also excluded all 
dummies that created sufficient near-multicollinearity as to prohibit estimation of our model. 
Similarly, we know that we have controlled for nearly all ofthe same variation with other 
variables in our model. 
In addition to the variables included in Equation (24), MARRIED; also exerted a significant effect 
on WAGE;. MARRIED; returns a "1" if the respondent was married in the survey year and a "0" 
otherwise. We exclude MARRIED; because marriage is endogenous. An increase in HSDUM; 
raises WAGE;, and this increase in WAGE; might increase the probability that respondent i 
marries. Respondent i might be more willing to marry ifhe/she earns a higher wage, and a higher 
wage might make respondent i a more attractive spouse. Ifwe control for i's marital status, the 
coefficient for HSDUM; does not capture HSDUM;'s total effect. Consequently, we estimate a 
reduced-form equation where the effect ofthe exogenous element of MARRIED; simply increases 
our error terms. 
Further Restrictions Placed on the Sample Population 
Before estimating Equations (22) through (24), we impose some restrictions on our sample 
population. We impose these restrictions in addition to the restrictions we impose on the 
population when estimating Equations (18) through (21). 
First, in Equations (22) through (24), we consider only those respondents who were not enrolled 
or attending school during the survey year. Attending school imposes a constraint on these 
respondents' earning potentials. We would like to know what our respondents earn without that 
constraint. Those respondents attending school earned slightly higher wages than the average 
respondent did. Hence, excluding them from our model may bias our estimates downward. In 
Equations (22) and (24), we exclude those respondents who did not disclose their state of 
residence for the survey year. Our employment/population ratio data contain some holes. In 
Equation (23), we exclude those respondents for whom employment and population statistics 
were not available by race, state, and age group. Some of our remaining respondents never 
answered the WAGE; question. Others did not answer the EMP; question in the same year as they 
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answered the WAGE; question. We could not include those respondents in our regression 
equations. As mentioned earlier, we also restrict Equation (24) to include only those respondents 
for whom EMP; equals one. Some of our wage observations may reflect data errors. We omit the 
one wage observation of$II,500lhr ($15,000 nominal 1993). We also omit the five wage 
observations falling below $llhr in 1983 dollars. Of our 545 remaining respondents, 282 earned 
less than $51hr in 1983 dollars. Because we do not include respondents who never disclosed a 
wage rate, we may bias our employment estimates upward. Some respondents may not reply 
because they never work, or because they work so infrequently that they cannot remember their 
last wage rate. If many such respondents exist, then we create an upward bias in our estimates of 
the economic return to the SBP and to classroom size reduction. We do not consider some 
respondents who are more likely to have zeros for EMP j • 
Results 
The next few pages explain results from the empirical models described above. We do not 
discuss results for our state-dummies or year-dummies. We discuss the chi-square statistic for 
adding the variables collectively for each equation. We do not interest ourselves with the 
academic or labor market performance. effects of living in one state or another. Including the 
information distracts from our statistical analysis. In the pages following our regression results, 
we provide information about year- and state-dummies for Equations (14), (19), (22), and (24). 
Modell: 
Table 10, Column 1 shows regression results from Equation (13) on page 43. Our SBP variable, 
BPEs" contributes very significantly (t = 5.40) to our attendance variable, APEs", We obtain a 
coefficient of 0.0995. For every 10 breakfasts served, I child shows up to school who would not 
have attended otherwise. Column 4 shows us the same SBP effect separated into a positive and a 
negative component. When we include both SBP variables, BPEs" and PPEs" in a linear model 
(Column 2), we obtain highly significant effects (t = 13.2 and -11.9). This linear model gives us 
coefficients of 0.602 and "-0.497 for BPEs" and PPES", respectively. We interpret the coefficient 
for BP Es" as we did with Column 1. Holding the number of participants constant, for every 10 
breakfasts served, 6.02 children show up to school who would not have attended otherwise. 
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As we discussed when we introduced Modell, we cannot easily interpret the coefficient for 
PPEs.1 in the linear model. We are more interested in the combined effect of increasing BPEs.1 and 
PPEs.1 simultaneously, We can most easily measure this effect using log form, as in Table 10, 
and adding the coefficients. As with the linear model, the effects for BPEs.1 and PPEs.1 are highly 
significant (t = 12.2 and -10.7, respectively). We turn our attention to LBPEs,t in Column 3. 
Holding the number of participants constant, a I 0% increase in the number of breakfasts served 
leads to a 1.66% increase in attendance.84 We add the coefficients from LBP ES•1 and LP P ES•1 and 
we obtain a coefficient of 0.0221. In order to calculate the standard error, we add the variances 
and add twice the covariance. The coefficients for LBP ES•1 and LP P ES•1 have a covariance of -
1. 70* 10-4. When we add the squares of the standard errors, add twice the covariance, and square 
root the sum, we obtain 0.00478. This value represents the standard error for our combined 
effect. 
In order to verify the standard error and t-statistic for the combined effect, we move to Equation 
(17), shown in Column 5. Column 5 shows essentially the same regression as Column 4 does, 
with the same sum of squared residuals. We multiply our coefficient for LBNPs., by two to obtain 
the effect of a simultaneous change of equal proportion in BPEs,t and PPEs.,' We double the 
coefficient 0.01103, and we obtain 0.0221, as with the previous model. We double the standard 
errors, and we obtain a standard error of 0.00473, roughly equivalent to our calculated standard 
error. The t-statistic for this collective effect is 4.62. Our coefficient indicates that, holding 
meals per participant constant, a 10% increase in participation in SBP schools results in a 0.221 % 
increase in attendance. 
The descriptive statistics from Table 11 provide us with information about various 
transformations of enrollment, ADA, and SBP variables. Rather than use means of ratios, we 
calculate ratios of means. The mean of breakfasts divided by the mean of participants gives us an 
average of 166 breakfasts per participant. If we hold this ratio constant, adding a new participant 
involves adding 166 new meals. The mean of ADA divided by the mean of enrollment gives us 
0.924. We multiply by 180, and we obtain an average student's yearly attendance of 166. We 
divide the average number of participants by average enrollment in SBP schools, and we obtain a 
mean participation ratio of 0.221. Given these averages, we can calculate a linear interpretation 
of our log formulation evaluated at the mean. 
84 Assuming constant enrollment, we may express effects on our dependent variable solely as effects on 
attendance. 
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Let us imagine an SBP school with 180 students. On a given day, we expect 166 students to 
show up. Over the year, our yearly attendance is 166*180 = 29,880 student days. Of these 
students, 0.221 *180 = 39.8 participate in the SBP. Imagine that we increase participation by 
10%, from 39.8 to 43.8 participants. On average, each of these new participants consumes 166 
breakfasts, so we serve 3.98*166 = 661 more breakfasts. This 10% change in participation 
increases attendance by 0.0211 * 10% = 0.211 %. By serving 661 breakfasts, we observe 
0.00211 *29,880 = 63.0 more instances in which a student shows up to school. Hence, we 
conclude that, on average, 100*63/661 = 9.53% of breakfasts given to new participants actually 
bring new participants to school. We can contrast this result with our result earlier from 
breakfasts given to current SBP participants. On average, more than half (60.2%) of the 
breakfasts given to current participants actually bring the participants to school. When we do not 
separate the two effects, as in Column 1, we find that adding 10 breakfasts increases attendance 
by 0.995. Our combined SBP effect falls much closer to the effect of adding new participants. 
hence, most of the difference in SBP participation across states reflects variation in participants 
per capita, not breakfasts per participant. 
As we discussed when we introduced Modell, our coefficients for TPENRs,1 and for LTPENRs,1 
are biased toward zero, because the variables describe teacher-pupil ratios across SBP and non-
SBP schools alike. Our most significant effect for this variable appears in Equation (13), shown 
in Table 10 in Column 1. From Table 11, we calculate a mean value for TPENRs,1 or 0.0547, or 
18.3 students per teacher. Ifwe reduce class size by 1 student, from 18.3 to 17.3, TPENRs,l rises 
from 0.0547 to 0.0578, increasing by 0.00316. We multiply this change by our estimated 
coefficient of 157.8. We find that a I-person drop in class size increases the average enrolled 
student's yearly attendance by 0.499. Next, we multiply by the mean value for SBP enrollment. 
We find that a I-person drop in classroom size leads to an average of 160,000 more instances of 
students showing up to class in a given state, an average of 889 more students each day. Our next 
most significant effect applies to the log variable, LTPENRs,l' We obtain a coefficient that is 
significant at the. 10% level, or at the 5% level if we use a I-tailed hypothesis test. We obtain a 
coefficient for LTPENRs,1 of 0.0493. Hence, a 10% increase in TPENRs,1 results in a 0.493% 
increase in attendance. At the mean, a 10% increase in TP ENRs,1 drops the average class size by 
1.7 students, from 18.3 to 16.6. At the mean, this drop leads to a 1461-student rise in ADA, 
263,000 more instances of children attending school, and a 0.819 increase inAPEs,l' Our first 
model finds a slightly bigger effect, as 0.819 / 0.499 = 1.64 < 1.7. Recall that our coefficients for 
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both variables, are biased toward zero. Note also that we have controlled for any fixed state or 
year differences in TP ENRs". 
We run chi-square tests on our state and year dummies to accept or reject them as groups. We 
accept the state dummies in all cases with greater than 99.5% significance. We accept the year 
dummies for Equations (13) and (14) with 99% significance. The year dummies in the last three 
regressions only show 75% significance. When we omit the year dummies from these 
regressions, our explanatory variables are still highly significant. None of the coefficients for our 
explanatory variables changes by more than 2%.85 In all cases, TPENRs" became highly 
significant with the omission of the year-dummies. 
Model 2: 
As before, we consider Model 2 in two sections. We interpret our results from Model2a in order 
to determine the SBP's effect on educational attainment. We interpret our results from Model 2b 
in order to estimate the earnings and employment effects of a high school diploma. We combine 
the results from our two models to estimate the economic return to a school breakfast. We obtain 
a crude costlbenefit ratio for the SBP using these estimates. We also calculate a crude 
costlbenefit ratio for classroom size reduction, using Card and Krueger's estimates. We find that, 
on the margin, the economic returns to the SBP exceeds by 45% the economic return to hiring 
new teachers. Our estimates are crude. Nevertheless, our model provides convincing evidence 
that the economic effect of the SBP at least rivals that of reducing classroom size. We do not find 
convincing evidence that policymakers can achieve this return by indiscriminately increasing the 
number of SBP participants. Our research suggests that selective expansion of the SBP could 
capitalize on substantial economic returns. 
Model2a: 
Table 12 provides descriptive statistics for a number of variables relevant to our model. The free 
breakfasts, ADA, and participation variables all represent sums for the years in which the 
respondent attended K-2. We represent these variables as FREEBK;, ADAKT2;, and PART;, 
respectively. Again, we calculate mean ratios by averaging before we divide. As we compare 
85 The coefficient for LBMPM changed by 14% with the omission of the year-dummies, but we only used the 
variable as a control to examine LBNP.,,'S coefficient. 
67 
the averages from Table 12, we understand more about the SBP during the period in question. 
Recall that each respondent began kindergarten sometime between 1967 and 1970. The SBP 
began in January 1967 and expanded very rapidly for the first few years. For the period in 
question, the average annual number of breakfasts divided by mean ADA equals 9.64. Again, 
our respondents do not constitute a representative sampling of their respective birth-states. If 
they did, would have eaten, on average, 9.64 free breakfasts per year from K-2. On average, our 
respondents come from state-year combinations in which SBP participants consumed 105 
breakfasts per year. Over the years in question, free breakfasts constituted 74.9% of total 
breakfasts served in the average state-year observation. On average, our respondents came from 
state-year combinations in which students attending SBP schools ate 28.6 breakfasts per year over 
the period in question. 
Columns 1 and 2 from Table 14 illustrate results from Equations (18) and (19), respectively. 
FBPA j shows effects just barely significant at the 5% level (p = 0.0503 and 0.0497, respectively). 
Our results fall well within 5% significance for a one-tailed t-test, though. In Column 1, our 
dependent variable, HGC j , ranges from 0 to 20, and our right hand SBP variable, FBPA j , ranges 
from 0 to 180. We obtain a coefficient of 0.247 for FBPA j • Hence, if the average number of 
breakfasts served per year in respondent i's state increased by 4.05 over the period, then the 
respondent would complete 1 more grade of school. Recall that the mean for FBPA j equals 9.64. 
To scale our number, we multiply 4.05 by the mean of ADAKT2 j , and then we divide by the mean 
PART;. We see that, at the mean, increasing FBPA j by 4.05 results in a 442 increase in breakfasts 
per participant over the three-year period, or 147 per year. 
These figures lead to two interpretations, which serve as upper and lower bounds for our 
estimates. These figures represent the lowest and highest numbers of breakfasts required to 
increases the average respondent's education level by one grade. Our errors-in-variables problem 
biases our coefficient downward. Consequently, we overestimate the number of breakfasts 
required to increase the average respondent's education level by one grade. Hence, the error term 
in our variables biases our upper and lower bounds upwards. We could assume that every 
respondent in our sample is an SBP participant. If so, then we conclude that 147 breakfasts per 
year from K-2 leads a respondent to finish one more year of school. Alternatively, we could 
conclude that our respondents constitute a representative sampling from their birth-states and age-
cohorts. If so, then we would conclude that giving a respondent 4.05 breakfasts per year from K-
2 leads a respondent to fmish one more year of school. These two estimates give us upper and 
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lower bounds for the SBP's effect on HGCj • We can expand this interval by one standard 
deviation on either side. Our interval for breakfasts per year required for one grade improvement 
becomes {2.68, 301}. The maximum number of breakfasts a participant can eat in a year is 180. 
Hence, we obtain a wide range of possible values. Ifwe use our upper bound plus one standard 
deviation, we predict a relatively small effect. This estimate predicts that no amount of school 
breakfasts eaten from K-2 can raise the average respondent's expected education level by one 
grade. According to this estimate, the SBP might still influence the education level of 
respondents on the border between two expected grade levels. Increasing these students' 
expected education levels could have substantial economic effects. In Model 2b, we examine the 
economic impact of the SBP's high school graduation effect, described below. 
We interpret results from Column 2 with a similar approach. Our average value for HSDUM; is 
0.753. Since we are using a logit model, the dependent variable in our regression is the log of an 
odds ratio. Hence, our dependent variable for a logit model evaluated at HSDUM;'s mean is log 
(0.753/(1-0.753)) = 1.11. Again, our mean value for FBPA j is 9.64. We would like to know the 
number of breakfasts required to increase by 5% the likelihood that a given respondent will 
graduate from high school. We imagine an average respondent with an average value of 
HSDUM; = 0.753. We increase this likelihood by 5%, up to 0.791. The log of our odds ratio 
becomes log (0.7911(1-0.791)) = 1.33. We divide (1.33 -1.11) = 0.22 by the coefficient for 
FBPA j , and we obtain a change in FBPA j of 0.579. At the mean, in order to increase by 5% the 
likelihood that a respondent will graduate high school, we must increase FBPA j by 0.579. As 
before, we can convert this number to obtain a maximum number of required breakfasts. We 
multiply 0.579 by the mean for ADA and divide by the mean for participation. We find that a 5% 
increase in likelihood requires 63.2 breakfasts over K-2, or 21.1 breakfasts per year for three 
years. A 5% increase in the probability of graduating from high school requires between 0.579 
and 21.1 breakfasts each year for the years K-2. If we tack on one standard deviation to each 
side, our interval expands to {0.384, 42.8}. Hence, a 5% increase in the probability of graduating 
requires somewhere between 0.384 and 42.8 breakfasts per year from years K-2. In Model 2b, 
we explore the economic effects of the SBP using the upper bound of21.1 breakfasts/year. 
Next, we consider the academic effect of increasing SBP participants and breakfasts 
proportionately. We turn our attention to Equations (20) and (21). The coefficient for BNP j , 
when evaluated at the mean, represents one half the effect of changing FBP A j and P P A j 
simultaneously in equal proportions. 
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Equations (20) and (21), as described in Columns 3 and 4, show marginally significant effects for 
BNP;. In both cases, the variable shows a significant effect at the 10% level and passes a one-
tailed t-test at the 5% significance level. When we regress either HaC; or HSDUM; on both 
FBPA; and PPA;, we show insignificant effects for both explanatory variables. Both independent 
variables show significant effects when used separately to explain HaC; or HSDUM;. The two 
variables show a correlation of 0.843. This collinearity prevents us from estimating accurate 
coefficients when we consider the variables together. Considering BNP; and BMP;, on the other 
hand, allows us to separate out the significant effect. BNP; and BMP;, still show some 
collinearity, but we obtain a significant effect for BNP;. The variable only shows a significant effect 
at the lO%-level. Using a one-tailed test, however, the variable shows significant effects at the 5%-level. 
We begin at the mean respective means for FBPA; and P PA;. We increase HGC; by one grade. 
Evaluated at the mean, Ll HGC; / Llw = 2*0.156, where 0.156 is the coefficient for BNP; in 
Equation (20). The factor, w, acts as the common multiplier for FBPA; and PPA;. Ifwe let Ll 
HaC; = 1, then Llw = 3.21. Since we began at the mean, w originally equalled one. In order to 
change HaC; by 1, we must increase w by 1. Hence, we multiply FBPA; and PPA; by 4.21. At 
the mean, we serve 15,300,000 breakfasts in the state and increase participants by 145,000 in 
order to raise the HaC; by 1 grade. Note that P PART; represents a sum of SBP participants in 
respondent i's birth-state for the years K-2. Hence, we add 48,300 participants and serve 
5,100,000 breakfasts each year for 3 years in order to raise HaC; by 1. Only 48,300 people 
experience the effects of those breakfasts, though. At the mean, these 48,300 people represent 
0.979% of a given state's population. We assume that new participants occur in our sample as 
often as they do in the general population. Hence, we assume that 7.01 of our respondents are 
new participants. We give each of them 105.6 new breakfasts per year for K-2, and HGC; 
increased by 1. Hence, we increase the number of breakfasts given to our respondents by 
7.01 *105.6 = 740 per year from K-2 to increase HaC; by 1. Hence, increasing free breakfasts 
specifically among new participants does not affect education level as much as does increasing 
breakfasts generally. Our estimated number of breakfasts per year exceeds our estimated upper 
bound for the more general HaC; specification. 
We perform similar operations with Equation (21) and Column 4. Let us again imagine that we 
increase by 5% the likelihood that a given respondent will graduate from high school. This 
increase requires a 0.22 increase in our dependent variable, the log of the odds ratio. Now 
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suppose that 0.22 / ~w = 2*0.217, where 0.217 is the coefficient for BNP j in Equation (20). We 
solve for ~w and we obtain 0.507. Hence, we increase FBPA j and PPA j simultaneously by 50.7% 
to increase by 5% the probability that the average respondent graduates high school. Hence, we 
serve 2,410,000 breakfasts to 22,900 / 3 = 7,630 participants. These 2,410,000 breakfasts 
distribute over three years, and they average 803,000 per year. Let us assume, again, that new 
participants occur in our sample as often as they do in the general population. By assumption, 
0.00155%, or 1.11, new participants join the SBP from our sample. Consequently, we serve 117 
breakfasts annually for 3 years in order to raise by 5% the likelihood of graduating from high 
school. Hence, our estimated effect on new participants falls in between our estimated upper and 
lower bounds for the more general HSDUM; specification. 
In addition to the SBP effects, we note an unexpected effect for one of our dummies. BLACKj 
returns a "I" ifthe respondent is black and a "0" if the respondent is not black. BLACKj exercises 
a strong positive effect on HSDUM;. The dummy exerts a significant positive effect (t = 1.99) 
even when we regress HSDUM; on BLACKj in a bivariate model. Among our sample of poor 
NLSY79 respondents, black respondents averaged 12.38 years of schooling, with average 
HSDUM; of 0.785. Hispanic respondents averaged 12.50 years of schooling, with average 
HSDUM; of 0.703. Non-black non-Hispanic respondents averaged 12.19 years of schooling, with 
average HSDUM; of 0.728. We might conclude that black families and communities provide 
cultural support and incentives to acquire more education. 
Other researchers have also found a black dummy to exert a positive effect on educational 
attainment. J. Kane and Spizman (1994) use data from the National Longitudinal Study of the 
High School Class of 1972 to examine educational attainment. The authors find that, all else ' 
equal, being black increases the probability that a student will attend college or graduate school. 
The authors suggest three possible explanations. First, affirmative action programs may make it 
easier for black people to attend college. In particular, the authors find that, all else equal, black 
students are more likely to receive grants or financial awards to attend college. Second, the SAT 
may show some cultural bias favoring black students. Third, black students may expect higher 
returns to a college education than other students do. Kane and Spizman cite a study by 
Meisenheimer (1990) indicating that black students do, in fact, experience higher than average 
returns to college. In J. Kane and Spizman's study, black students were less likely to attend for 
college when the authors did not control for income and family background variables. Our 
findings show that, among poor students, black students are more likely than average to graduate 
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from high school. Our results hold even when we do not control for income. We could attribute 
this effect to SATs or to college affirmative action programs. Students who face fewer barriers to 
entering college also face a greater incentive to graduate from high school. Black students also 
might experience (and consequently expect) higher than average returns to a high school 
education. 
We have tested the chi-square statistics for adding the 41 state dummies or the 4 age dummies 
(replacing a constant term). For the HSDUM; regressions, we could reject the hypothesis that the 
coefficients for all the state-dummies are zero with 99.5% confidence. For our HGC; equations, 
we can reject that same hypothesis with about 85% confidence. For the HGC; equations, we can 
reject the hypothesis that the coefficients for the age cohorts are equal to zero with 95% 
confidence. For the HSDUM; regression, we can reject the same hypothesis with 99% 
confidence. 
Model2b: 
Table 13 shows descriptive statistics for the variables included in Equations (22) through (24). 
Note that the number of observations changes from equation to equation. As mentioned when we 
outlined the model, we impose different restrictions on the sample populations for Equations (22), 
(23), and (24). These changes in the sample population slightly alter the descriptive statistics for 
many variables. Equation (23) helps us to understand what sort of variation our state- and year-
dummies capture. We do not use Equation (23) to determine our costlbenefit ratio. We do not 
concern ourselves with slight sample differences between Equation (22) and Equation (23). We 
impose a further restriction on our sample when we estimate Equation (24). We require that 
respondents were employed in the survey week. To estimate the total earnings effect of the SBP, 
we combine HSDUM;'s effect on EMP; with its effect on !og(WAGE/CPI;). Using this combined 
effect, we calculate a crude estimate of the total economic effect of participating in the SBP. 
Column 1 shows us results from Equation (22), described earlier. Our mean value for EMP; is 
0.829, obtained from Table 13. Again, we use a logit model, so our dependent variable is the log 
of an odds ratio. Our dependent variable for a logit model evaluated at EMP;' s mean is 
log(0.829/(1-0.829» = 1.58. In Equation (22), we obtain a coefficient of 0.697 for HSDUM;. Our 
mean value for HSDUM; for our sample is 0.748. Ifwe increase the expected value of HSDUM; 
by 5% from 0.748 to 0.785, we increase the log odds ratio for EMP; from 1.58 to 1.58 + 
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0.697*0.0374 = 1.61 . Dividing the inverse log of this number by one plus its inverse log, we 
obtain 0.833 as our expected value of EMP j • Hence, at the mean, a 5% increase in the expected 
value of HSDUM; leads to a 0.483% increase in the expected value of EMPj • From Model 2a, 
serving 63.2 school breakfasts to a child from K-2 will cause such a 5% increase in the expected 
value of HSDUM;. Hence 63.2 breakfasts cause a 0.483% increase in the expected value of 
EMPj , an increase of 0.014 standard deviations. 
Column 3 tells us the wage effect of an increase in the expected value of HSDUM;. Among the 
542 employed persons in our sample, the mean value for HSDUM; is 0.788. In Column 3, we 
estimate a coefficient of 0.226 for HSDUM;, meaning that being a high school graduate raises 
wages by 22.6%. If, instead, we increase HSDUM;'s expected value by 5%, from 0.788 to 0.827, 
!og(WAGE/CPlj ) increases by 0.226*0.0394 = 0.00883. Hence, at the mean value for 
!og(WAGE/CPlj ), a 5% increase in mean HSDUM; r~ises !og(WAGE/CP1i) from 1.6544 to 
1.6632. This increase corresponds to an increase in real wages from 1983 $5.2299/hr to 1983 
$5.2763/hr, an increase of 0.014 standard deviations .. Hence, among working persons at the 
mean, serving 63.2 school breakfasts from K-2leads to a 1983 $0.0464lhr increase in wages. 
When we replace HSDUM; with HGCj in Equation (24) (not shown), we obtain a highly 
significant coefficient of 0.0810. Ashenfelter estimates the return to a year schooling for his twin 
samples somewhere between 8% and 11 %. We find that, for our sample of respondents, the 
return to a year of schooling falls closer to Ashenfelter's lower bound of 8%. 
Using a chi-square test for Equation (22), we can reject at the 0.5% significance level the null 
hypothesis that the set of dummies exerts no effect for each set of dummies. When we include 
all our dummies in Equation (22), very few of our descriptive significantly affect EMPj • Equation 
(23) includes descriptive variables rather than dummies. By including the descriptive variables, 
we can better understand some of the variation that our dummies capture. Using a chi-square test 
for Equation (24), we can reject the null hypothesis at the 97.5% significance level for the state-
of-residence-dummies. We can reject the null hypothesis at the 95% significance level for the 
birth-state-dummies. We exclude the year dummies from Equation (24) because they exert no 
significant effect on log real wages. We do not reject the null hypothesis for inclusion of the 
year-dummies in Equation (24) at the 25% significance level (p < 0.75). 
The mean value of EMP j for our sample population not enrolled in school is 0.829. The mean 
value of EMPj for our total sample population is 0.815. Of our 695 respondents who disclosed 
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employment and school enrollment information in the survey year, 33 were attending school. Of 
those 33,51.5% were employed during the survey week. Let us imagine that, at the mean, a 
respondent from our sample has a job 81.5% of the time. Employed respondents attending school 
at the time of the survey earned an average of 1983 $5.501hr. Employed respondents not 
attending school earned a mean wage of 1983 $5.23Ihr. 
Now, let us give this average respondent63.2 breakfasts over K-2. For our estimates, we ignore 
the SBP's effect on respondents' education levels past high school. We assume that, for ages 18-
64, breakfasts eaten do not affect the percentage of respondents who attend school in a given 
year. In doing so, we underestimate the total wage effect of the SBP. Among our respondents 
not attending school, expected EMP; rises from 0.829 to 0.833. Holding employment among 
respondents in school constant, employment for our tota1695 respondent sample increases from 
0.815 to 0.818. Hence, we imagine that our respondent is employed 81.8% ofthe time. Our 
respondent's expected wage when working has also risen from 1983 $5.2299Ihr to 1983 
$5.27641hr. 
We make the simplifying assumption that an increase in the employment rate does not decrease 
the mean wage. Hence, we assume that, on average, unemployed persons enter jobs at the mean 
wage. In reality, on average, unemployed persons probably enter jobs at lower than the real 
wage. This assumption will bias our estimates upwards. In the US, the average workweek has 
declined slowly over the past two decades. From Table 13, we see that the average response year 
for Equations (22) and (24) averages to about 1992. Hence, we choose the 1992 average of 34.4 
hours/week, taken from the 1993 Statistical Abstract of the United States. We assume that, when 
working, our respondents work the average number of hours weekly. Respondents from our 
sample are unemployed more often than the average American is. Consequently, we expect that 
part-time workers will be disproportionately among respondents in our sample. Hence, assuming 
the average workweek for our respondents biases our estimates upward. Unlike the average 
workweek from our sample, the mean US workweek averages people from many age groups. 
Let us assume that a given respondent works 81.5% of the time for each week from age 18 
through age 64, a total of2,450 weeks. Hence, this mean respondent works a total of 0.815 * 
34.4 hrs/week * 2450 weeks = 68,700 hours in hislher career. At the mean wage, this respondent 
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earns a total of 1983 $359,000 in hislher career.86 Now, we give the respondent 63.2 breakfasts 
as a child. In doing so, we increase the average employment level from 0.815 to 0.818. We also 
increase the average wage from 1983 $5.22991hr to 1983 $5.27641hr. At the higher employment 
level, our mean respondent works a total of 0.818 * 34.4 hrs/week * 2450 weeks = 68,900 hours 
in hislher career. At the higher mean wage, our respondent now earns a total of $364,000 in 
hislher career. Hence, giving the mean respondent 63.2 breakfasts over K-2 has increased hislher 
expected lifetime earnings by 1983 $5,000. Alternatively, we could give 351 breakfasts to new 
SBP participants to achieve the same goal. 
Using Glantz and others' estimations, the mean total cost ofa breakfast equals 1992 $1.67 = 1983 
$1.19. Hence, an investment of 1983 $1.19 * 63.2 breakfasts = 1983 $75.21 returns a total of 
1983 $5000 over the 47 years of the respondent's working life. Hence, a 1983 $1 investment in 
the SBP returns a total of 1983 $66 over the respondent's working life. We could invest the 
dollar any time between kindergarten and 2nd grade. Assuming constant annual returns, this 
investment would return $1.40 every year for 47 years, beginning 11-13 years after the initial 
investment. If we restrict our investment to new SBP participants, a 1983 $1 investment in the 
SBP returns a total of 1983 $14 over the respondent's working life. Assuming constant annual 
returns, this investment returns only 1983 $0.30 per year for 47 years. 
We can compare our estimated rate of return to the rate of return on 10-year US Treasury Bills. 
Our breakfast calculations use data from 1967-1970, so we imagine purchasing T-Bills beginning 
in 1968. Let us imagine that we earn the annualized rate of return on T-Bills from 1968 to 1994. 
As we see from Table 21, if we earned the annualized rate of return for T-Bills every year from 
1968 to 1994, our initial 1983 $1.00 would be worth 1983 $1.98 at the end of 1994. Let us 
imagine that, on the other hand, we invested this 1983 $1.00 in the SBP. If we give the 1983 
$1.00 worth of breakfast to a 1 st grader in 1968, we begin to earn returns in 1980. Once we earn 
the 1983 $1.40 at the end of each year, we reinvest the money in to-year T-Bills. By 1994, our 
initial investment has returned 1983 $29.20. Alternatively, if we invest 1983 $1 in new SBP 
participants, our initial investment returns 1983 $6.25 by 1994. 
Let us consider, alternatively, that we use our money to hire new teachers. Card and Krueger 
estimate that a 10% reduction in class size led to a 0.4% to 1.1% increase in a child's future 
earnings. Let us use the higher figure and calculate a costlbenefit ratio. The Digest of Education 
86 Recall that our sample includes only respondents from disadvantaged backgrounds. 
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Statistics provides us with numbers of teachers, ADA, and average teacher salaries by state for 
the 1969 school year. Using these data, we calculate the average class size, and the cost per pupil 
of reducing a state's average classroom size by 10%. In doing so, we assume that teacher salaries 
remain constant while the number of teachers increases. If the demand truly did increase, we 
expect that teacher salaries would also increase. Nevertheless, we are interested in marginal 
changes, which should not significantly affect prices. For the total US, we calculate this amount 
at 1983 $127/yr. For a weighted average of our 716 respondents' states, we calculate this amount 
at $120/yr. Let us assume that one year of a small classroom size suffices to create the 1.1 % 
earnings increase. Card and Krueger do not calculate teachers' effects on employment. Hence, 
we will compare Card and Krueger's estimates with our estimates forwage increases from the 
SBP. We ignore employment effects for this comparison. We must assume that classroom size 
affects wages in our sample in the same amount as it affects wages in the general population. 
Since classroom size. probably affects our respondents more, this assumption biases our estimate 
downwards. At the mean, a 1.1 % increase in earnings increases wages from 1983 $5.2299 to 
1983 $5.2874 for our sample. Let us make the same assumptions as before about employment 
and hours worked. This classroom size reduction raises lifetime earnings from 1983 $359,000 to 
1983 $363,000, a 1983 $4000 increase. Considering a 1983 $120 cost per pupil, spending 1983 
$1.00 on a new teacher for one pupil raises the pupil's lifetime earnings by 1983 $33 .00~7 
Now, let us compare this effect with solely the earnings effect of spending a dollar on the SBP. If 
we multiply the higher wage by the lower number of hours, we obtain 1983 $362,000 lifetime 
earnings. Hence, considering only earnings, 62.1 breakfasts increase lifetime earnings by $3,000. 
Hence, spending $1.00 on the SBP raises the pupil's lifetime earnings by $48.00. Ifwe consider 
the economic effect of adding new SBP participants, 351 breakfasts increase lifetime earnings by 
$3,000. Hence, spending $1.00 on new SBP participants raises the pupil's lifetime earnings by 
$7.20. Hence, our estimated SBP effect exceeds Card and Krueger's estimated classroom size 
reduction effect by 45%. If a 10% classroom size reduction led to a 1.6% wage increase, then the 
two rates ofretum would be equal. Dollar for dollar, our lower bound for the SBP's earnings 
effect rivals our lower bound for the earnings effect of classroom size reduction. We also observe 
that Card and Krueger's estimated classroom size reduction effect exceeds our new SBP 
participant effect by nearly 460%. Again, our estimates are crude and downward-biased. 
Nevertheless, increasing the SBP appears to show a very strong effect. Our results for increasing 
87 Card and Krueger estimate separate school quality effects by state. Future researchers might try the same 
technique with the SBP. 
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SBP participants are not so conclusive. Recall that we used the greater bound for the return to 
classroom size reduction. We simply cannot reject the null hypothesis that the effect of 
classroom size reduction equals or exceeds the effect of adding new SBP participants . 
. There exist alternative means of improving education. Allgrist notes the option of teacher 
training programs.88 Researchers know relatively little about the economic effects of this low-
cost means for improving school quality. Nevertheless, not knowing the economic returns to 
such a policy, the SBP provides an appealing, low-cost means for improving children's 
educational experiences. 
CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we explored the SBP and short and long-term academic effects of the program. We 
first described the mechanics of the SBP. Next, we reviewed relevant studies about breakfast, the 
SBP, schooling, and school quality. Using results and models from the literature, we presented a 
formal argument that the SBP influences long-term academic performance. Figure 2 illustrates 
that formal argument in a flow diagram. We combined USDA state-level SBP data with a variety 
of other data resources to construct empirical models of the SBP's academic effects. Our two 
empirical models present strong evidence that the SBP exerts a significant positive effect on both 
attendance and educational attainment. Evidence from our second empirical model indicates that 
the economic effect of the SBP rivals that of classroom size reduction. Our results suggest that 
these returns require increasing the meals given to existing SBP participants, not simply 
increasing ~e number of SBP participants. 
In our first model, we use pooled, annual, state-level data to examine the SBP's effect on 
attendance in participating schools. We find that, on average, for every 10 breakfasts served, 
0.995 children attend school who would not have otherwise attended. We find stronger effects 
when we hold the number of participants constant. Among those students who already participate 
in the SBP, for every 10 breakfasts served, 6.02 children attend school who would not have 
otherwise attended. Among new participants, for every 10 breakfasts served, 0.953 children 
attend school who would not have attended otherwise. 
88 Lecture. 22 March 2000. 
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In the first part of our second model, we examined the SBP's effect on educational attainment. 
We use longitudinal data from the NLSY79. We estimate probabilities of SBP participation 
using respondents' birth-states and state-level SBP data. Errors in variables prevent us from 
estimating specific values. We obtain an upper and lower bound for the number of breakfasts 
required to increase the average student's expected attainment by one grade. We similarly bound 
the SBP's effect on high school graduation from above and below. In addition, we estimate the 
attainment effect of adding new participants to the SBP. We use our estimation of the SBP's high 
school graduation effect to determine the economic returns to the SBP. We find that, on average, 
consuming 63.2 school breakfasts from K-2 increases a respondent's likelihood of graduating 
high school by at least 5%. We obtain this upper bound by assuming that all of the respondents in 
our sample participated in the SBP. Consequently, we distribute the SBP's total effect over all 
716 respondents in our sample. The real number of SBP participants in our sample probably falls 
short of716. Hence, we probably underestimate the SBP's effect on education levels. We also 
estimate the educational attainment effect of giving breakfasts to new participants. To increase 
by 5% the likelihood that a new SBP participant graduates from high school, the new participated 
consumes 351 school breakfasts. 
Given these upper bounds, we extend our empirical model to estimate the economic returns to the 
SBP. We estimate high school graduation'S effect on future employment and earnings. Making a 
series of heroic assumptions, we obtain a crude costibenefit ratio for the SBP. We estimate that, 
at the mean, 1983 $1 spent on the SBP returns 1983 $66 in increased employment and earnings 
over a respondent's working life. Alternatively, $1 spent on new SBP participants returns 1983 
$14 in increased employment and earnings over a respondent's working life. Hence, assuming 
constant annual returns, 1983 $1 spent on the SBP in 1968 returns 1983 $1.40 every year from 
1980 to 2026. Also assuming constant annual returns, 1983 $1 spent on new participants in 1968 
returns $0.30 every year from 1980 to 2026. When find that our estimated returns from the SBP 
exceed Card and Krueger's estimated returns to classroom size reduction by 45%. Because our 
estimates are crude and rely on a string of heroic assumptions, we do not estimate standard errors 
for our estimate. Our evidence merely shows that the economic return to the SBP rivals that of 
classroom size reduction. Nevertheless, our upper bound Card and Krueger's estimated effect far 
exceeds our downward-biased estimated effect for giving school breakfasts to new participants. 
Hence, we do not obtain conclusive evidence about the effect of increasing SBP participation. 
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Recently, the SBP has attracted a good deal of media attention and political momentum. As 
mentioned earlier, school districts have been experimenting with universal free breakfast 
programs for the past few years. Some, like the programs in Minnesota and in Maryland, simply 
offer free breakfast to any student who shows up early. ,Others, like more recent pilot program in 
Maryland, offer free breakfast in class. Now, Congress has proposed similar programs to be 
adopted, nationwide. 
Our estimations shed some light on the recent efforts to expand the SBP. Our research provides 
substantial evidence to back the claim that the SBP improves children's academic performance. 
If these universal free breakfast programs affect poor, marginal SBP participants, then the 
economic return to these programs is probably very high. If the investment only increases SBP 
participation rates, however, the economic return may not exceed the return to classroom size 
reduction. Table 21 illustrates the huge returns to be gained through investing in the SBP. 
On the other hand, the universal free breakfast programs may affect more students who do not 
qualify for free or reduced-price meals. Our models do not predict the effects of such a program. 
Our estimates do suggest, however, that there exist huge economic gains to be realized by 
expanding the SBP among existirig participants. To the extent that universal free breakfast 
programs reduce the stigma cost for existing participants, these new programs may realize some 
of these economic gains. For the most part, these programs have primarily focused on increasing 
the numbers of SBP participants. Our research shows that such a program shows very high 
returns. 
Nevertheless, there exist even larger economic gains to be realized by expanding a different 
dimension of the SBP. Existing SBP participants stand to experience tremendous gains from 
increasing breakfasts per participant. In 1998, SBP participants consumed an average of 165 
meals per year. Hence, we can only increase the average breakfasts per participant by about 15 
breakfasts. With 7.2 million participants, at 1983 $1.19/breakfast, we obtain a maximum 
investment of 15 breakfasts*7.2 million participants*1983 $1.19 = 1983 $130 million each year. 
Not much room exists to expand the SBP among existing participants. Some non-participants 
may, however, exhibit the same high returns as existing participants do. These non-participants, 
probably poor, might attend SBP schools, or they might attend non-SBP schools. Such non-
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participants may exist. If so, then selective expansion of the SBP offers a means to enjoy the 
same return as we observed in our 716-respondent sample. 
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Graph 2: Daily Breakfasts as a Percentage of Total Enrollment, 1967-98 
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Table 1: FY2000 Reimbursement Rates for 48 Contiguous 
States 
Eligibility Non-Severe Need Severe Need 
Full Price $0.21 $0.21 
Reduced -Price $0.79 $1.00 
Free $1.09 $1.30 
Table 2: Mean Enrollment by Grade and SBP Availability, 
1978 US GAO Sample 
Grade Level SBP Schools Non-SBP Schools All Schools 
Elementary 505 386 406 
Junior High 584 443 459 
Jr.-Sr. High 1240 861 890 
Consolidated 470 446 449 
Special 337 477 455 
All Grades 585 494 504 
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Table 3: Significant Variables in NSLP Demand by Age and 
Eligibility Status 
Age Group Free or Reduced Price Eligible Full Price 
Ages 6-11 -Food Stamp Program (FSP) Race, -Price, 
Bonus (in $),89 UrbanIRural, +VitaminA, 
Income, +Household Size, +Age 
Race, 
-Calories Consumed at Other 
Meals 
Ages 12-18 +Extent of Female Head's -Price, Race, 
Employment, Race, UrbanIRural, 
+Vitamin A, UrbanlRural, -Age 
-Age, -Income, 
-Calories Consumed at Other 
Meals 
89 At this time, the FSP still restricted food choices, which likely altered participants' behavior 
significantly. 
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Table 4: Breakfast Composition by Source 
Home breakfast School breakfast 
Grits, oatmeal, cold Biscuits, bread, toast, 
cereal rolls 
Pancakes Milk, cheese 
Ham, bologna Bacon, sausage (contains 
Pop, candy, dessert items TVP9o) 
Fruits 
Education (in years) 
Figure 1: Return to Years of Education by Level 
of Educational Quality 
90 Texturized vegetable protein (a soy product). 
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Figure 2: Proposed Cause and Effect Relationship for the SBP 
Nutrient Intake 
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Table 5: Variables and Years Available for USDA 
SBP Data Set, State-Level Observations 
Variable'! Years Available Years 
Annually by Available 
State Nationwide 
by Month 
Schools 1967-1998, 1967-1975 
Participating in excluding 
the Program 1976(TQ)92 
Enrollment in 1974-1998, 1974-1975 
SBP Schools excluding 
1976(TQ) 
Average Daily 1967-1998, 1967-1975, 
Attendance in excluding 1982-1998 
SBP Schools 1976(TQ) 
Participants 1967-1998 1967-1975, 
1982-1998 









Average Daily 1970-1998 1970-1975, 
Breakfasts 1982-1998 
Total Breakfasts 1967-1998 1967-1975, 
1982-1998 
Free Breakfasts 1976-1998 1982-1998 
Reduced-Price 1976-1998 1982-1998 
Breakfasts 
Free & 1967-1975 1967-1975 
Reduced-Price 
Breakfasts 
Free & 1967-1998 1967-1975, 
Reduced-Price 1982-1998 
Breakfasts as a 
Percentage of 
Total Breakfasts 
Average 1967-1975 1967-1975 
Indemnity Rate 
Children's 1967-1970 1967-1970 
Contribution 
Cost of 1967-1970 1967-1970 
Purchased Food 
Federal CNA 1969-1973 1969-1973 
Funds 
Federal Section 1969-1973 1969-1973 
32 Funds 
Total Federal 1967-1998, 1967-1975, 





91 In 1967, the USDA also tracked Other Cash [Income] (besides income from children, states, and the 
federal government), Donated Labor, Total Income from States, Total Income, Food Expenditure, Paid 
Labor, Donated Labor, Other Cash [Expenditure], Total Expenditure, all in dollars, and Food as a 
Percentage of Total 
92 The label, 1976TQ, denotes "1976 Transition Quarter." In 1977, the USDA changed the fiscal year from 
July-June to October-September. The transition quarter includes ,uly, August, and September 1976. We 
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Figure 3: Venn Diagram of Enrollment, ADA, and SBP Variables 
P2*LBNPs,t + P3*LBMPs,t = 
P2*(LBPEs,t + LPPEs,t) + P3*(LBPEs,t-LPPEs,t) = 
(P2 + P3)*LBPEs,t+ (P2 - P3)*LPPEs,t = 
1t2*LBPEs,t + 1t3*LPPEs,t 
Figure 4: Conversion of Coefficients 
from Equation (17) to Equation (16). 
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Let Yi = bl * (x/x + z/z) + b2 * (x/x - z/z), where x = mean(xi) and z = mean(zi). 
Imagine we begin at Xi = x and Zi = z. Holding x and z constant, we increase Xi 
and Zi by a factor w. We would like to know the resulting change in our 
dependent variable, Yi. We substitute wx and wz for Xi and Zi, add ~Yi to the 
left side and solve for ~ Yi . 
Yi + ~Yi = bl*(wx/x + wzlz) + b2*(wx/x - wz/z). 
Yi + ~Yi = bl*(w + w) + b2*(w - w). 
Yi + ~Yi = 2w*bl. Take the derivative of Yi with respect to w. 
~Y/~w = 2*bl. 
Figure 5: Mathematical Rationale Behind BNP; and BMP;, Evaluated at the Mean. 
Table 6: Composition of 716-Respondent NLSY79 Sub-Sample 
Male Female Total 
Black 189 173 362 
Hispanic 59 52 111 
Non-black, 116 127 243 
non-Hispanic 
Total 364 352 716 
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Adj. R2 0.979 
Tables 6-8 
describe . . 
regressIOns usmg 
annual data from 
51 states 
(including DC) 
over 29 years 
(1967-1995) 
Table 8: USDA Data Year-Dummy 
Regression 
Variable BPA"I Var. BPAs, I 














1983 Adj. R2 0.983 
Years 1967-1969 omitted for comparison 
Table 8: USDA Data State-Dummy Regression 
Variable BPAs,1 Var. BPAs, I Var. BPAs, I 
C 37.8*** 
(1o.n 
AL 6.83 LA OR 
(13 .0) 
AK -24.5* ME PN 
(13.:n 
AZ -3.34 MD RI 
(130) 
AR 14.1 MA SC 
f13.n 
CA -4.12 MI SD 
(13.0) 
CO -22.9* MN TN 
(}3.22) 
CT -21.4 MS TX 
(13 .1) 0 
0'1 
DE -5.26 MO UT 
(13.0) 
DC 0.946* MT VT 
(1:1.m 
FL 14.5 NE VA 
(13.n 
GA 4.72 NV WA 
(13 .0) 
HI -22.1 NH WV 
(Hn 
ID -17.0* NJ Wl 
(}3.n 
IL -17.4 NM WY 
(13.n 
IN -19.8 NC US,I_} 
(13J) 
IA -13.4 ND Us, 1-2 
(13.m 
KS 25.9 OH Adj. R2 0.980 
(13.n 
New York omitted for comparison 
Table 10: Regression Results for Modell 
Variable APEs,/ APEs,/ LAPEs,t LAPEs,t LAPEs,/ 
Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 Column 5 
C 145.37*** 152.38*** 5.0950*** 5.0941 *** 5.0941 *** 
(4.46) (4.42) (0.0893) (0.0859) (0.0859) 
BPEs,t 0.0995*** 0.6017*** 
(0.0184) (0.0456) 










TPENRs,/ 157.8** 95.2 
(75.4) (71.3) 
LTPENRs,t 0.0493 0.0320 0.0320 
(0.0294) (0.0283) (0.0283) 
Us,t-l 0.2102*** 0.2197*** 0.2139*** 0.2358*** 0.2358*** 
(0.0281 ) (0.0284) (0.0282) (0.0283) (0.0283) 
Adjusted R2 0.212 0.309 0.211 0.292 0.292 
Data cover 51 states (including DC) and 22 years (1974-1995). Coefficients for State and Year Dummies Not Shown 
Table 11: Descriptive Statistics for Variables in Modell, 1121 Observations 
Variable Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. 
SBPENROLLs,t 3.21 E+5 1.59 E+5 3.64 E+6 1760 4.95 E+5 
SBPADAs,t 2.96E+5 1.46 E+5 3.37 E+6 1670 4.58 E+5 
BKTOTs,t 1.18 E+7 5.58 E+6 1.36 E+8 57600 1.75 E+7 
PARTICIPs,t 71100 33600 7.53 E+5 257 1.04 E+5 
TEA CHERSs, t 44800 32900 2.40 E+5 4090 44800 
ADAs,t 7.56 E+5 . 5.50E+5 5.20 E+6 69100 8.14 E+5 
ENROLLs,t 8.19 E+5 5.89 E+5 5.54 E+6 79800 8.65 E+5 
APEs,t 166 167 178 102 6.49 
YATPENs" 166 166 188 147 4.78 
BPEs,t 38.8 35.9 131 4.38 15.4 
LBPEs,t 3.58 3.58 4.87 1.48 0.397 
PPEs,t 41.9 37.4 144 4.14 17.6 
LPPEs,t 3.65 3.62 4.97 1.42 0.413 
LBNPs,t 7.24 7.20 9.84 2.90 0.803 
LBMPs,t -0.0699 -0.0725 0.460 -0.931 . 0.109 
TPENRs,t 0.0566 0.0563 0.0787 0.0395 0.00772 
LTPENRs,t -2.88 -2.88 -2.54 -3.23 0.138 
Table 12: Descriptive Statistics for Variables in Model2a, 716 Observations 
Variable Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. 
HGC; 12.3 12 20 7 1.97 
HSDUM; 0.753 1 1 0 0.432 
FREEBK; 4.75 E+6 2.81 E+6 2.90 E+7 44313 5.62 E+6 
ADAKT2; 4.93 E+6 3.35 E+6 1.41 E+7 218 E+5 3.64 E+6 
PART; 45200 27100 2.60 E+5 1000 45800 
SBPADAKT2; 1.65 E+5 1.13 E+5 8.68 E+5 2860 1.64 E+5 
FBPA; 1.16 0.792 9.05 0.00663 1.25 
BPM; 1.00 0.682 7.79 0.00570 1.08 
PPA; 0.0119 0.00804 0.131 0.000327 0.0136 
PPM; 1.00 0.673 . 11.0 0.0274 1.14 
BNP; 2.00 1.38 16.1 0.0331 2.13 
BMP; 3.56 E-5 -0.00458 1.65 -6.15 0.624 
HGCMOM; 9.65 11 20 0 2.97 
INCOME78; 6440 5470 70000 0 5000 
FSIZE; 5.86 6 15 2 2.32 
IPF; 1210 1060 12500 0 1050 
CTMEDINC; 8320 8440 13800 3090 2120 
BLACK; 0.506 1 1 0 0.500 
MALE; 0.508 1 1 0 0.500 
RESPAGE; 22.9 21 36 18 5.24 
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Table 13: Descriptive Statistics for Variables in Model2b 
Variable Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev Obs. 
EMP; (Eqn. 22) 0.829 1 1 0 0.377 662 
EMP; (Eqn. 23) 0.854 1 1 0 0.354 636 
WAGE;{Eqn. 24) 8.29 7.00 45.70 1.74 4.74 542 
CPI;{Eqn. 24) 1.41 1.45 1.45 0.909 0.0727 542 
WAGE/CPI; (Eqn. 24) 5.87 4.84 31.6 1.20 3.29 542 
Log(WAGE/CPIJ (Eqn. 24) L65 1.58 3.45 0.186 0.457 542 
HSDUM; (Eqn. 22) 0.748 1 1 0 0.435 662 
HSDUM; (Eqn. 23) 0.761 1 1 0 0.427 636 
HSDUM; (Eqn. 24) 0.788 1 1 0 0.409 542 
MALE; (Eqn. 22) 0.515 1 1 0 0.500 662 
MALE; (Eqn. 23) 0.524 1 1 0 0.500 636 
MALE; (Eqn. 24) 0.506 1 1 0 0.500 542 
BLACK; (Eqn. 23) 0.509 1 1 0 0.500 636 
BLACK; (Eqn. 24) 0.506 1 1 0 0.500 542 
HGCMOM; (Eqn. 24) 9.63 11 20 0 3.04 542 
INCOME78; (Eqn. 24) 6,530 5,400 70,000 200 5,291 542 
FSIZE; (Eqn. 24) 5.88 6 15 2 2.34 542 
IPFj (Eqn. 24) 1,230 1,070 12,500 33.3 1,120 542 
AGE; (Eqn. 23) 28.62 29 31 23 1.84 636 
AGE; (Eqn. 24) 28.8 29 31 18 1.92 542 
WREMP; (Eqn. 23) 491,000 254,000 3,680,000 3,730 605,000 636 
WRPOP; (Eqn. 23) 648,000 347,000 472,000 4,240 788,000 636 
WREMP;lWRPOP; (Eqn. 23) 0.735 0.747 1 0.511 0.0757 636 
WYear; (Eqn. 22) 1991.72 1993 1993 1980 2.07 662 
WYear; (Eqn. 24) 1992.21 1993 1993 1981 1.56 542 
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Table 14: Regression Results for Model 2, Equations (18) - (21) 
Variable HGCi (OLS) HSDUM (Logit) HGCi(OLS) HSDUM(Logit) 
Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 
FBPAi 0.247* 0.380** 
(0.126) (0.194) 
BNPi 0.156* 0.217* 
(0.0813) (0.120) 
BMPi 0.0176 0.226 
(0.351) (0.552) 
HGCMOM 0.0929*** 0.0838** 0.0926*** 0.0839** 
(0.0251) (0.0356) (0.0252) (0.0356) 
IPFi 0.000170** 0.000169** 
(6.78E-05) (6.79E-05) 
INCOME78i 7.76E-05*** 7.76E-05*** 
(2.86E-05) (2.86E-05) 
-CTMEDINCi -0.000214*** -0.000268*** -0.000213*** -0.000269*** 
(5.42E-05) (7.67E-05) (5.43E-05) (7.68E-05) 
BLACKi 0.231 0.587** 0.231 0.588** 
(0.178) (0.250) (0.178) (0.250) 
MALEi -0.215 -0.627*** -0.218 -0.625*** 
(0.137) (0.198) (0.137) (0.199) 
RESPONSEAGE -0.525*** -0.686** -0.523*** -0.687** 
l8i (0.200) (0.273) (0.200) (0.273) 
RESPAGEi 0.1216*** 0.0349 0.122*** 0.0349 
(0.0150) (0.0233) (0.0150) (0.0233) 
AGE_14i 10.114 1.106 10.107 1.10 
(0.760) (1.12) (0.760) (1.12) 
AGE_15i 10.227 0.892 10.208 0.896 
(0.725) (1.071) (0.728) (1.072) 
AGE_16i 10.788 1.835 10.778 1.84 
(0.718) (1.06) (0.719) (1.06) 
AGE_17i 10.591 1.74 10.582 1.74 
(0.726) (1.07) (0.726) (1.07) 
Adjusted RL 0.192 0.191 
Log Likelihood -1397 -336 -1397 -336 
Regressions using restricted sample of 716 NLSY79 respondents. 
Coefficients for birth-state dummies not shown. 
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Table 15: Regression Results for Model 2: Log Fonnulation, Equations (19) - (21) 
Variable HGCj (OLS) HSDUM; (Logit) HGC;(OLS) HSDUM;(Logit) 
Column.} Column. 2 Column 3 Column 4 
LFBPA; -0.254 -0.424** 
(0.154) (0.215) 
LBNPj -0.0639 -0.102 
(0.135) (0.195) 
LBMP j -0.287 -0.493 
(0.291) (0.432) 
HGCMOM; 0.105** 0.985*** 0.105*** 0.0984*** 
(0.0254) (0.359) (0.0254) (0.0360) 
LIPFj 0.125 0.126 
(0.113) (0.113) 
LINCOME78j 0.333** 0.334** 
(0.161) (0.161) 
LCTMEDINCj -1.70*** -2.13*** --1.70*** -2.11 *** 
(0.420) (0.611J (0.420) (0.610) 
BLACKj 0.241 0.572** 0.242 0.575*** 
(0.179) (0.247) (0.179) (0.248) 
MALE; -0.224* -0.643*** -0.223 -0.641 *** 
(0.138) (0.199) (0.138) (0.199) 
RESPONSEAGE -0.547** -0.716*** -0.551 *** -0.724*** 
18j (0.200) (0.271) (0.201) (0.272) 
RESPAClEj 0.117*** 0.0255 0.117*** 0.0260 
(0.0150) (0.0230) (0.0150) (0.0230) 
AGE_14j 2354 16.57 24.58 18.29 
(3.84) (5.74) (4.25) (6.27) 
AGE_15 j 23.30 15.86 24.38 17.65 
(3.84) . (5.73) (4.28) (6.31) 
AGE_I6j 23.42 16.08 24.59 18.01 
(3.84) (5.74) (4.35) (6.41) 
AGE_17; 22.87 15.39 24.11 17.43 
J3.86) (5.74) (4.42) (6.45) 
Adjusted R2 0.187 0.186 
Log Likelihood -1397 -338 -1397 -338 
Regressions using restricted sample of716 NLSY79 respondents. 
Coefficients for birth-state dummies not shown. 
LBNPj and LBMP; represent the sum and the difference, 
respectively, of FBP A; and P P A;. 
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Table 16: Regression Results for Model 2, Equations (22) - (24) 
Variable EMP; (Logit) EMPj (Logit) log(WAGE/CPIJ (OLS) 
Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 
C -3.55** -18.4*** 0.203 
(1.63) (2.89) (0.340) 
HSDUM; 0.697* 0.875*** 0.224*** 
(0.399) (0.267) (0.0476) 
MALE· l 0.971 ** 0.685*** 0.166*** 
(0.383) (0.256) (0.0385) 
BLACK; -0.694** -0.138*** 
(0.322) (0.0503) 
HGCMOM; . 0.0223*** 
(0.00671) 
IPFj 2.91 E-5 
(1.84 E-5) 
WAGEAGE j 0.609*** 0.0378*** 
(0.0807) (0.0113) 
WREMP/WRPOP j 3.44* 
(1.95) 
Adjusted R:l 0.216 
Log Likelihood -122 -216 -232 
Observations 662 636 542 
Coefficients for year-, state-of-residence-, and birth-state-dummies for Equation (22) not 
shown. Coefficients for state-of-residence- and birth-state-dummies for Equation (24) not 
shown. Equation (23) did not include these dummies. 
96 
Table 17: Year- and State-Dummy Coefficients For Equation (14) 
Years 1974 and 1975 and New York State omitted for comnarison Var. APEs" Var. APEs" 
(r.nt'r!) (cnt'r!) 
Variable APEs" Var. APEs" IN 3.15 NC 3.75* 
(r.nt'r!) (107) (? 0,\) 
1976 -0.204 1993 3.20** IA 3.83* ND 3.65* 
(LOn (1Ao) (1.9q) (1 QQ) 
1977 0.261 1994 3.53** KS 2.78 OH 1.69 
(1.17) (1.4n (200) (?o(:;) 
1978 -0.149 1995 3.73*** KY 3.72* OK 0.831 









1980 1.32 AK -0.651 ME 4.09** PN 2.84 









1982 3.16** AR 3.49* MA 4.46** SC 4.43** 
(1.26) (10'\) (701) no,;) 
1983 3.46*** CA 4.17* MI 3.51 SD -2.80 
(1.2&) (2.32) (117) (1 04) 
1984 3.35** CO 6.18*** MN 4.79** TN 5.23** 
(1.30) (2.05) (10n (1 14) 
1985 2.64** CT -3.70* MS 4.28** TX 5.25*** 
(1.11) (2.10) (2.17) nom 
1986 3.32** DE 2.38 MO 2.53 UT 5.42** 
(111) (2.0m (2.on (? ;:1,\) 
1987 3.40** DC 1.50 MT -3.42* VT 4.25** 
(1.14) (1on (19q) (?.Oln 
1988 3.07** FL 4.12** NE 2.36 VA -0.689 






(1 1 (:;) 
WA 6.29*** 
(11n 
1990 3.33** HI 6.58*** NH 1.36 WV 2.71 
(140) (2.1&) (1 qq) (700) 
1991 2.96** ID 0.0959 NJ 1.94 WI -0.0843 
(J.4n (11 (';) (2.04) (1 QQ) 
1992 3.63*** IL 2.37 NM 5.53*** WY 1.19 
(1.39) (707) (201)) (? o?) 
















HSDUM; Var. HSDUM; 
0.966 KY -1.68 
Var. HSDUM; 
New York State omitted for 
comparison. Restricted Sample did 
not include respondents from 
Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Maine, 
Nevada, New Hampshire, North 














Table 19: Year-, State-of-Residence-, and Birth-State-
Dummy Coefficients For Equation 22 
New York omitted for comparison. All other omitted 
states left out due to perfect multicollinearity. 
Var. EMP; 
Variable EMP; Var. EMP; Var. EMP; 
CO 1.77 
Table 20: State-of-Residence- and Birth-State Dummy Coefficients For Equation 24 
New York omitted for 
comparison. All other 
omitted states left out due to 
perfect multicollinearity. 
AL -0.265 




Table 21: Rates of Return on 10-Year T -Bills Versus SBP, 1968-1994 
Year Annualized Inflation 10YTB Real Real Real 
return on Rate Interest Value of Cumulative Cumulative 
10-Year T- Rate $110YTB Value of Value of$l 
Bills Minus Purchased $1 Spent Spent on 
(10YTB) Inflation in 1968 on SBP in NewSBP 
Divided 1968 Participants 
by 100 in 1968 
1968 5.65 4.2 0.015 1.02 0.0 0.0 
1969 6.67 5.5 0.012 1.03 0.0 0.0 
1970 7.35 5.7 0.017 1.04 0.0 0.0 
1971 6.16 4.4 0.018 1.06 0.0 0.0 
1972 6.21 3.2 0.030 1.08 0.0 0.0 
1973 6.84 6.2 0.006 1.11 0.0 0.0 
1974 7.56 11 -0.034 1.12 0.0 0.0 
1975 7.99 9.1 -0.011 1.08 0.0 0.0 
1976 7.61 5.8 0.018 1.07 0.0 0.0 
1977 7.42 6.5 0.009 1.09 0.0 0.0 
1978 8.41 7.6 0.008 1.09 0.0 0.0 
1979 9.44 11.3 -0.019 1.10 0.0 0.0 
1980 11.46 15.5 -0.040 1.08 1.40 0.30 
1981 13.91 10.3 0.036 1.04 . 2.70 0.59 
1982 13.00 6.2 0.068 1.08 4.20 0.91 
1983 11.10 3.2 0.079 1.15 5.90 1.27 
1984 12.44 4.3 0.081 1.24 7.80 1.67 
1985 10.62 3.6 0.070 1.34 9.80 2.11 
1986 7.68 1.9 0.058 1.44 11.90 2.55 
1987 8.39 3.6 0.048 1.52 14.00 3.00 
1988 8.85 4.1 0.048 1.59 16.10 3.45 
1989 8.49 4.8 0.037 1.67 18.30 3.91 
1990 8.55 5.4 0.032 1.73 20.30 4.36 
1991 7.86 4.2 0.037 1.78 22.40 4.80 
1992 7.01 3.0 0.040 1.85 24.60 5.27 
1993 5.87 3.0 0.029 1.92 27.00 5.78 
1994 7.09 2.6 0.045 1.98 29.20 6.25 
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Glossary of Variables for Empirical Models: Modell 
BPEs,t - Total SBP breakfasts served in the state that year divided by total enrollment in 
SBP schools. This variable is defined mathematically as BKTOTs,t / SBPENROLLs,t. 
BKTOTs,t - Total SBP breakfasts served in the state that year 
APEs,t - 1808 times Average Daily Attendance (ADA) in SBP schools in the state that 
year divided by Enrollment in SBP schools in the state that year. This variable is defined 
mathematically as 180* SBP ADAs,t / SBP ENROLLs,t 
ENROLLs,t- Total enrollment in the public schools K-12 in the state that year. This 
includes SBP schools and non-SBP schools. Because some private schools offer the 
SBP, it is conceivable that SBPENROLLs,t would exceed ENROLLs,t. Nevertheless, 
ENROLLs,t is always greater than or equal to SBPENROLLs,( in our data set. 
LBPEs,t - Natural log of the quotient of total SBP breakfasts divided by enrollment in 
SBP schools. This variable is the natural log of B PEs, (, and i,s equal to the difference in 
the natural logs ofBKTOTs,t and SBPENROLLs,t. 
LAPEs,t - Natural log of the quotient of 180* ADA in SBP schools and Enrollment in 
SBP schools. This variab lIe is the natural log of AP Es,t and is equal to Log(180) + 
Log(SBP ADAs,t) - Log(SBP ENROLLs,t). 
LBMPs,t - Difference of the natural logs of BPEs,t and PPEs,t. When we regress LAPEs,t 
on both this variable and LBNPs,t, the coefficient for LBMPs,/ represents the effect of 
increasing the number of breakfasts served while holding the number of participants 
constant. Mathematically, this variable represents Log(BKTOTs,t) - Log(180) -
Log(P ARTICIPs,t). 
LBNPs,t - Sum of the natural logs of BP Es,t and P P Es,t. When we regress LAP Es,( on both 
this variable and LBMPs,,, the coefficient for LBNPs,t r~presents the effect of increasing 
the number of participants served while holding the number of breakfasts per participant 
constant. Mathematically, this variable represents Log(BKTOTs,t) + Log(180) + 
Log(PARTICIPs,t) - 2*Log(SBPENROLLs,t). 
LPPEs,t - The natural log of 180 times participants, or "participant days," divided by 
enrollment in SBP schools. This number will always be greater than or equal to LBPEs,t. 
Mathematically, we represent this variable as Log(180) + Log(PARTICIPs,() -
Log(SBP ENROLLs,t). 
LTPENRs,t - The natural log of the state teacher-pupil ratio. Mathematically represented 
as Log(TEACHERSs,t) - Log(ENROLLs,t). 
a The length ofa school year varies by school. We select 180 as a rough estimate of the average number of 
school days per year. 
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PARTICIPs,t - The number of SBP participants in the state that year. This variable 
counts students in the state who ate anywhere between 1 and 180 breakfasts that year. 
This variable will always be less than or equal to SBP ENR OLLs, t. Moreover, 180 times 
this variable will always be greater than or equal to BKTOTs,t. 
PPEs,t - 180 times participants, or "participant days," divided by enrollment. This 
variable counts the number of times when a participant could have eaten breakfast. This 
variable will always be greater than or equal to BP Es,t. Mathematically represented as 
180 * PARTICIPs,t/ SBPENROLLs,t. 
SBPADAs,t- Average Daily Attendance (ADA) in SBP schools. This variable does not 
represent ADA over the year. Instead, this variable represents ADA in SBP schools in 
the state-year observation over the peak month nationally. 
SBPENROLLs,t - Total enrollment in SBP schools in the state that year. 
States,d- State dummy. Returns a "I" for an observation in state s and a "0" otherwise. 
TEACHERSs,t - Total number of teachers in public schools K-12 in the state that year. 
Part-time teachers are added as fractions of full-time teachers. 
TPENRs,t - Teachers divided by enrollment in public schools K-12 in the state that year. 
We use this variable to proxy for the teacher-pupil ratio in SBP schools in the state that 
year. As noted in the write-up, the coefficient for TPENRs,t underestimates the effect of 
changing the teacher-pupil ratio in SBP schools in a given state and year. 
Mathematically represented as TEACHERSs,t / ENROLLs,t. 
Yeart,d - Year dummy. Returns a "1" for an observation in year t and a "0" otherwise. 
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ADAKT2; - The sum of Average Daily Attendance (ADA) in public schools in the 
respondents' state of birth for the years in which the respondent was 5, 6, and 7 years old. 
We expect that the respondent entered kindergarten at age 5. Hence, these years 
represent the years when the respondent attended kindergarten, 1 st grade, and 2nd grade. 
Henceforth, we will refer to this period as the years from K-2. 
AGE XX;- Cohort dummy. Returns a "I" if the respondent was:XX years old in 1979 
and a "0" otherwise. Our restricted sample includes respondents who were aged 14-17 in 
1979. 
BLA CK; - Race dummy. Returns a "1" if the respondent is black and a "0" otherwise. 
BOTHPARENTS; - Nuclear family dummy. Returns a "I" if the respondent lived with 
both parents from birth until age 18 and a "0" otherwise. The original NLSY79 did not 
include this question. Respondents answered this question in a follow-up survey in 1988. 
FBPA; - The sum of free breakfasts in respondent i's state over the years from K-2 
divided by the sum of ADA in respondent i's state over the years from K-2. 
Mathematically represented as FREEBKi / ADAKT2 i. 
BPM; - FBP Ai divided by its own mean. 
BMP; - The difference of FBP Ai divided by its mean and P P Ai divided by its mean. 
BMPi and BNPi serve the same purpose as do LBMPs,t and LBNPs,t in Modell. When we 
regress HGCi on BNPi and BMPi simultaneously, we obtain coefficients u\ and U2, 
respectively. U2 represents the effect on HGCi of changing the relative sizes of FBP Ai and 
PPA j • The same applies when we regress HSDUM;. Mathematically, we define BMPi as 
FBPAi / Mean(FBPA j ) -PPA j / Mean(PPA j). 
BNP; - The sum of FBP Ai divided by its mean and P P Ai divided by its mean. When we 
regress HGC j on BNPj and BMPi simultaneously, we obtain coefficients u\ and U2, 
respectively. Ul represents the combined effect on HGCi of changing FBPA j and PPA j 
simultaneously. At the mean values for FBPA j and PPA j, U\ represents the combined 
effect on HGCi of changing FBP Ai andP P A j simultaneously in equal proportions. The 
same applies when we regress HSDUMj• Mathematically, we define BNPj as FBPA; / 
Mean(FBPA j ) + PPA j / Mean(PPA j ). 
BState;,$ - Birth-state dummy. Returns a "1" if the respondent was born in state s and a 
"0" otherwise. Our sample only includes those respondents who lived in their respective 
birth states at age 14. 
Cohort;,t - Vector of cohort dummies AGE _14; through AGE _17;. 
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CPI; - Consumer Price Index for WYear;. The average price level from 1992 to 1994 is 
scaled to equal 100. 
CTMEDINC; - Median family income in respondent i's county of birth in 1966. Note 
that respondent i's county of birth is not necessarily respondent i' s county of residence at 
age 14. 
EMP; - Returns a one if the respondent was employed in the survey year and a zero 
otherwise. Survey year determined by most recent response to WAGE;. 
FREEBK; - The sum of free SBP breakfasts served in respondent i's state for the years 
K-2. SBP schools provide free breakfasts to all interested students living at 130% 
poverty or below. 
FSIZE; - The size of respondenti' s family in 1979. Does not exceed 16. 
HGC; - The highest grade (0 -20) that respondent i completed. Every follow-up survey 
in the NLSY79 included this question. We take each respondent's most recent answer to 
this question. 
HGCMOMi - The highest grade (0-20) that respondent i's mother completed. This 
variable typically exercises a significant effect on a given student' s educational 
attainment. Father's education level does not typically exercise a significant effect on a 
student's attainnient; Moreover, many of our respondent' s did not know their father's 
education level. 
HISPANIC; - Race dummy. Returns a "1" if the respondent is Hispanic and a "0" 
otherwise. 
INCOME78; - Respondent ;'s family income in 1978. Out sample only includes 
respondents who lived with their parents in 1979. Hence, we assume that family income 
in 1978 includes parents' income. 
IPF;- Respondent's family income in 1978 divided by family size in 1979. INCOME78; 
tells us more about respondent ;' s parents, while IPF tells us more about the resources 
available to the respondent as a child. 
MALE; - Sex dummy. Returns a "I" if the respondent is male and a "0" otherwise. 
MOMA GE; - Age of respondent i's mother in 1987. Less than half of the respondents 
answered this question. The original NLSY79 survey did not include this question. 
Respondents answered this question in a follow-up survey in 1987. 
PART; - The sum of the number of participants in the SBP in respondent i's state for the 
years K-2. 
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PPA; - The sum over the years K-2 of the number ofSBP participants in respondent i's 
state divided by the sum over the years K-2 of ADA in respondent j's state. 
Mathematically represented as PARTj / ADAKT2 j • 
PPM; - P P A j divided by its own mean. 
RESPA GE; - Respondent j's age when he or she most recently reported highest grade 
completed. This variable ranges from 18 to 36. Our sample omits every respondent who 
did not report highest grade completed after age 17. 
RESPONSEAGE_18;-Age 18 dummy. Returns a "I" if the respondent was 18 years 
old when he or she reported highest grade completed and "0" otherwise. 
RState;,s - State-of-residence-dummy. Returns a "1" if respondent i lived in state s in 
WYearj and a "0" otherwise. 
SBPADAKT2; - The sum over the years K-2 of ADA in SBP schools in respondent i's 
state. 
WAGE; - Respondent i's most recent answer to the question: "What is the wage rate of 
your current or most recent job?" 
WREMPj - The number of employed persons in respondent i's race and age-group in 
respondent i's state of residence in WYearj~ 
WREMPi - Population in respondent i's race and age-group in respondent i's state of 
residence in WYearj. 
WYear; - The year of respondent i's most recent wage response. 
WYear;,t - Wage year-dummies. Returns a "1" if WYearj = t and a "0" otherwise. 
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